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Under modern democratic theory, the font of sovereignty springs from the
people; however, traces of its past as a power emanating from the Crown continue
to haunt the domestic and international status of sub-sovereign legal entities such
as U.S. Territories. Quiescent sovereignty describes that which is possessed by the
people of the Territories; a sovereignty that is theirs, but that is wielded on their
behalf by the federal government. Although fiduciary responsibilities attach to this
arrangement, cycles of attention/neglect are the modus vivendi. Bilateral
relationships between the Territories and the federal government are varied, but
such differences should not impact their voices in Congress. Institutional
adjustments to provide more impetus to Territorial issues are readily possible. Just
as the European Union came to realize the importance of sub-national input at the
federal level by creating the European Union’s Committee of the Regions, so too
should the U.S. House of Representatives create a Permanent Select Committee on
Territorial Affairs chaired by a Territorial Delegate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Stacey Plaskett took the floor of the United States Senate one month
after the bloody insurrection against the Capitol on January 6, 2021, to manage
her portion of the impeachment trial of President Donald J. Trump, she spoke
truth to power. “Truth is truth, whether denied or not, and the truth is, President
Trump had spent months calling his supporters to a march on a specific day, at
a specific time, in specific places to stop the certification [of the U.S.
presidential election].”1 As the congressional Delegate from the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Ms. Plaskett stood in the well of the Senate, facing down those seeking
to destroy their own government, defending a presidential election in which her
constituents couldn’t even vote; defending an American democracy not fully
open to her. The symbolism of that moment should be lost on no one.2
Americans living in the U.S. Territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern
Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are vestigial,
yet living, reminders of our country’s not so rosy past. Although this past never

1. 167 CONG. REC. S630 (2021). In her presentation, Ms. Plaskett displayed a love of country,
common among non-voting Americans living in the Territories, that was lacking on the part of citizenvoter insurrectionists who seized the Capitol on January 6:
When I first saw this model . . . , I thought back to September 11. I know a lot of
you Senators were here. . . . I was also here on September 11. I was a staffer at
that time. . . . I worked in the Capitol, and I was on the House side.
This year is 20 years since the attacks of September 11, and almost every day
I remember that 44 Americans gave their lives to stop the plane that was headed
to this Capitol Building. I thank them every day for saving my life and the life of
so many others.
Those Americans sacrificed their lives for love of country, honor, duty—all
the things that America means. The Capitol stands because of people like that—
this Capitol that was conceived by our Founding Fathers, that was built by slaves,
that remains through the sacrifice of service men and women around the world.
And when I think of that, I think of these insurgents, these images, incited by
our own President of the United States, attacking this Capitol to stop the
certification of a Presidential election, our democracy, our Republic.
Id. at S634.
2. Like Ms. Plaskett, America’s first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, also hailed from
the West Indies and New York City; as a founding father, the bricks he laid in our American political
foundation remain cornerstones of the national government. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER
HAMILTON (2004).
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completely equated citizenship with voting rights,3 linkage sometimes
occurred. For example, at our genesis both White men and White women were
citizens, yet women could not vote—nor could impoverished White men. By
the mid-19th Century, “equality” was considered to have been achieved by
extending the franchise to all White men regardless of their financial position.
Citizenship was granted to both Black men and Black women after the Civil
War, yet gender-based discrimination in voting continued. White women
achieved the right to vote in 1920, and Native Americans achieved citizenship
in 1924 but not full voting rights in some states until 1957.4 The franchise was
then extended to citizen youth in 1971.5
Despite this protracted, sometimes grudging, expansion of participation in
our American democracy, citizens or residents of U.S. Territories remain
disenfranchised. For those living in Ms. Plaskett’s at Large Congressional
District for the U.S. Virgin Islands, they are U.S. citizens but can only send a
non-voting delegate to one house of Congress; further, they cannot vote for the
U.S. presidency.6 Territorial residency arbitrarily limits citizenship.7 Yet the
Territories are constituent parts of the United States.8 Since the voices of
American islanders in the Territories cannot be registered at the ballot box, the
only way they can be heard is through their five non-voting delegates to
Congress; consequently, that voice must be amplified.
Over a century ago, President Woodrow Wilson described “our territories
over sea” as lying “outside the charmed circle of our own national life” in his
first State of the Union address to Congress in 1913.9 A description that
unfortunately holds true today. Despite acknowledging this otherness, he cast
America’s duty toward them as a fiduciary one—acting on their behalf and for

3. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (2002).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Patty Ferguson-Bohnee, How the Native American Vote Continues
to be Suppressed, 45 HUM. RTS. MAG., no. 1, Feb. 9, 2020, https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/voting-rights/how-the-native-americanvote-continues-to-be-suppressed/ [https://perma.cc/32CW-33F3].
5. Grace Panetta, Olivia Reaney & Talia Lakritz, The 19th Amendment Passed 100 Years Ago
Today. The Evolution of American Voting Rights in 244 Years Shows How Far We’ve Come—And
How Far We Still Have to Go, BUS. INSIDER, Aug. 18, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/whenwomen-got-the-right-to-vote-american-voting-rights-timeline-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/HGP6HLAB].
6. DOUG MACK, THE NOT-QUITE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA xxiii (2017).
7. For example, my Chamorro law student’s change in residency from Guam to Nebraska gave
her the right to vote for president in the 2020 presidential election, yet her parents and grandparents,
still residents of Guam, were unable to do so.
8. MACK, supra note 6, at xiii.
9. President Woodrow Wilson, State of the Union Address to Congress (Dec. 2, 1913).
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their betterment, but also acting as trustee that considers the unique situation in
each territory:
[T]here stand out our obligations toward our territories over
sea. Here we are trustees. . . . Such territories, once regarded
as mere possessions, are no longer to be selfishly exploited;
they are part of the domain of public conscience and of
serviceable and enlightened statesmanship.
We must
administer them for the people who live in them and with the
same sense of responsibility to them as toward our own people
in our domestic affairs. No doubt we shall successfully enough
bind Porto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands to ourselves by ties
of justice and interest and affection, but the performance of our
duty toward the Philippines is a more difficult and debatable
matter. We can satisfy the obligations of generous justice
toward the people of Porto Rico by giving them the ample and
familiar rights and privileges accorded our own citizens in our
own territories, and our obligations toward the people of
Hawaii by perfecting the provisions for self-government
already granted them; but in the Philippines we must go
further. We must hold steadily in view their ultimate
independence, and we must move toward the time of that
independence as steadily as the way can be cleared and the
foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid.10
Both historically and currently regarded as part of the United States,
America’s territories have appeared and disappeared over time—some
becoming states, while others become independent. On occasion, America goes
to war when they are attacked, as in the case of our entry into the Second World
War after Japanese assaults on the American territories of Hawaii, Wake Island,
the Philippines, Guam, and Midway.11 Conversely, America can fail to come
to their rescue when natural disasters strike, such as the devastation wrought on
Puerto Rico by Hurricane Maria.12 Indeed, a consistent theme characterizing
America’s relationship with our territories has in fact been our inconsistency.
Importantly, despite disparate treatment, U.S. Territories do not exist in a
legal vacuum. However, the legal order in which they reside, and the kind of
sovereignty they enjoy, is of a Janus-faced character: at once both distinctly
international and distinctly domestic.13 Conceptually, sovereignty is a tricky
10. Id.
11. Anna Diamond, Telling the History of the U.S. Through its Territories, SMITHSONIAN MAG.,
Jan. 2019.
12. Id.; Tom C.W. Lin, Americans, Almost and Forgotten, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2019).
13. Luke Glanville, The Antecedents of ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, 17 EUR. J. INT’L REL.
233, 242–43 (2010).
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thing—those who don’t have it want it more than anything else, and those who
have it oftentimes mishandle it. Crawford describes it as one of the least helpful
aspects of law that we must still contend with: “The term ‘sovereignty’ has a
long and troubled history, and a variety of meanings. . . . It is not itself a right,
nor is it a criterion for statehood.”14
In form, sovereignty comes in all shapes and sizes and is divisible in many
ways, as our constitutional system has shown. But the source of sovereignty is
always the same: The people. Quiescent sovereignty describes the type of
sovereignty that pertains in U.S. Territories. This quasi-dormant sovereignty is
exercised by them in the governance of their internal affairs and on their behalf
externally by the federal government. Although the people of the Territories,
with the exception of American Samoa, may have had no say in the possession
of their islands by the United States, they subsequently have chosen to remain
with the United States.
Expression of the Territories’ quiescent sovereignty at the federal level
should be heard. Channeling the voices of our Territories into a newly formed
House Permanent Select Committee on U.S. Territories would not only
accomplish that amplification, but also focus their power into new, meaningful
oversight and hearings, as well as open a new path to heightened legislative
impact. Currently, territorial voices in Congress are nonexistent in the Senate
and muted in the House—buried in what is functionally an unnamed
subcommittee of the Natural Resources Committee.
This Article revisits colonial and territorial sovereignty theory in Part II—
once accepted in the pre-human rights era as enlightened governance theory15—
explores sovereignty theory as a foundation for understanding the quiescent
sovereignty of U.S. Territories in Part III, and then offers an institutional
solution in Part IV operationalizing that quiescent sovereignty in a manner
14. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2d ed. 2006).
15. Lebbeus R. Wilfley, How Great Britain Governs Her Colonies, 9 YALE L.J. 207, 207 (1900).
Wilfley featured a case study of how the British Empire governed its colonies as a roadmap for how
the United States should govern its own newly acquired territories in the wake of the Spanish-American
War, declaring, “The record of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain is a wonderful record,” and that:
The peculiar interest which attaches to the study of the Colonial Empire of Great
Britain at the present time arises out of three considerations. First, because it is
the most extensive and successful system of colonization the world has seen;
second, because the prestige which it has brought to the British nation is being
seriously menaced by the reversals now being sustained by British arms in South
Africa; and, third, because the United States have recently acquired possessions,
some of which are so far removed from our shores and are surrounded by such
climatic, social, racial and religious conditions that they will have to be treated,
for a time at least, as dependencies, before they can be incorporated into the
Federal Union.
Id.
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aimed at increasing the political influence of U.S. Territories in Congress. As
important as they are, Territorial movements for statehood and voting rights are
ably discussed elsewhere16 and, as such, are not treated in this Article.
As abstract as this analysis may be, there is a certain urgency underlying it.
The dawn of the 21st Century has seen a return of big powers bestriding the
planet with renewed thirst for territorial acquisition. Russia grabbed Crimea
from Ukraine and claimed the Arctic seabed by planting a Russian flag under
the North Pole, and China continues to increase direct governance from Beijing
in Hong Kong, the territory it acquired from Great Britain with promises to the
contrary, while simultaneously ratcheting up its territorial claims to Taiwan and
aggressive possession of the South China Sea—where it has built up over eighty
islands and reefs in a ring that encompasses 85% of the 1.4 square nautical miles
of ocean.17
In an age when territorial expansionism is in vogue once again, America
needs to get its territorial act together sooner rather than later. This Article’s
contribution is intended as a significant step in that direction.
II. COLONIAL & TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY THEORY
Sovereignty is power. It is the power to control one’s own destiny; the
foundation of self-determination.18 Self-determination, in turn, is an extension
of popular sovereignty. “A legitimate government, according to this
conception, derived their powers from the consent of the people.”19 Possessions
of other states, be they colonies or territories, cannot fully exercise that power.
Yet, by virtue of the people living in them, such possessions theoretically have
that residual power, albeit resting in a dormant or quiescent state.20 Sovereignty
is then exercised on behalf of that possession by the dominant state.

16. See, e.g., José R. Coleman Tió, Comment, Six Puerto Rican Congressmen Go to Washington,
116 YALE L.J. 1389 (2007); Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession,
43 YALE J. INT’L L. 229 (2018).
17. MACK, supra note 6, at 277–78; Robert A. Manning & Patrick M. Cronin, Under Cover of
Pandemic, China Steps Up Brinksmanship in South China Sea, FOREIGN POL’Y, May 14, 2020,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/south-china-sea-dispute-accelerated-by-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/8PC2-DEGU]; Steven Pifer, Crimea: Six Years After Illegal Annexation,
BROOKINGS, May 17, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimeasix-years-after-illegal-annexation/ [https://perma.cc/YK75-ZYTJ].
18. Lori Damrosch, Nationalism and Internationalism: The Wilsonian Legacy, 26 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 493, 500 (1994).
19. Glanville, supra note 13, at 240.
20. David Isenberg, Reconciling Independence and Security: The Long-Term Status of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 210, 220 (1985); M.F. LINDLEY, THE
ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–17 (1926).
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Modes of exercising this sovereignty by the dominant state can take many
forms: complete internal and external control; retention of external control
while granting internal governance/autonomy; or even retention of external
control while granting internal governance to a corporate entity such as in the
case of the British East India Company.21 Regardless of its form of exercise,
the conceptual foundations of sovereignty have changed over time.
A. Historical Roots
Historically, Euro-centric civilization acquired and disposed of territory
around the globe in a casually transactional manner, not unlike the buying and
selling of apartment complexes near a city center. Akin to landlords who hold
and convey such titles, states gave no more thought to the people living in those
territories than the landlords give to the people living in their apartments.22 This
transactional approach was grounded in its theoretical origins: “The
international rules regarding territorial sovereignty are rooted in the Roman law
provisions governing ownership and possession, and the classification of the
different methods of acquiring property is a direct descendant of the Roman
rules dealing with property.”23 Such was the state of affairs.
However, just prior to the Enlightenment, two unlikely things converged,
creating a perfect storm that transformed international law. First was the
conception of statehood, and second was the conception of popular sovereignty.
The disastrous Thirty Years’ War in Europe concluded with the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648.24 Agreements struck there are commonly regarded as the
birthplace of the state system, underpinning modern international law.25 Instead
of individual rulers (monarchs and emperors), states became the primary actors
on the international stage. Consequently, state interests came to the fore. The
interests of kings and queens, typically directed at squabbling royal families
21. See generally PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2011); LINDLEY, supra note 20, at
94. For a discussion of atrocities committed by entities such as the British and Dutch East India
Companies in the discharge of their internal governance mandates see MICHAEL J. KELLY,
PROSECUTING CORPORATIONS FOR GENOCIDE 16–26 (2016).
22. See, e.g., Lau Siu-Kai, Colonial Rule, Transfer of Sovereignty and the Problem of Political
Leaders in Hong Kong, 30 J. COMMWEALTH & COMP. POL. 223 (July 1992); LINDLEY, supra note 20,
at 328 (“In the earliest periods of European expansion into countries inhabited by backward peoples,
little or no respect was, as a rule, paid to the lives or liberties of the natives . . . the story of their
treatment at the hands of the Europeans is a painful one.”).
23. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (5th ed. 2003).
24. Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”—
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 371–73 (2005).
25. Glanville, supra note 13, at 234–35.
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with concerns about which princess would wed which prince to secure which
military alliance, were replaced with much broader interests of the state,
characterized by securing better trade routes and stabilizing international
relations, as the primary motivating factors in foreign affairs.26
The second conception, arising before Westphalia and peaking in its
aftermath, relocated the locus of sovereign power. From the time of Caesar,
beginning with the demise of the Roman Republic and the establishment of the
Roman Empire, sovereign power resided in the vessel of the ruler.27 More often
than not, that person ruled by divine right and, therefore, could not be easily
challenged. 17th Century democratic thinkers, for a variety of reasons not least
of which included avoiding further royal adventures across national frontiers,
laid the foundations for extracting sovereignty from the vessel of the ruler and
placing it in the people.28 Westphalia afforded a unique opportunity by creating
the secularized state to be the new vessel in which the people could vest their
sovereign power and elect governments to animate that sovereignty on their
behalf.29 “[A] state’s power is understood to derive from its members. The
idea of popular sovereignty is that a contract has been formed among the
members to establish a state to delegate to it powers to act on their behalf.”30
The states and governments that emerged into this new world took a variety
of forms—some completely embracing democratic theory as in the cases of
Switzerland or France, others blending the approaches with increasing
parliamentary supremacy as with Great Britain, and still others resisting for as
long as possible, as with Tsarist Russia or Imperial Austria-Hungary or
Ottoman Turkey, until the great leveling of the First World War finally lay
waste to most of the old systems. Wilson’s ideal of self-determination took
26. Kelly, supra note 24, at 371–73.
27. Glanville, supra note 13, at 240; John A. Jameson, National Sovereignty, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 193,
194–95 (1890).
28. Kelly, supra note 24, at 374–77.
29. Kelly, supra note 24, at 370–77:
Once Westphalia took the religion out of the rule, sovereignty was essentially
secularized. Writing during the peace negotiations at Westphalia, Hobbes
developed his famous social contract theory in Leviathan (1651) to explain the
autonomous self-sufficient commonwealth (state) which no longer required
divine authority for legitimacy. Although he acknowledged God’s continued
relevance, Hobbes severed the dependency relationship between what he termed
the immortal God (divine) and the mortal God (state), describing the mortal god
as an “artificial man” constructed from the collectivity of men adhering to the
same social contract within which “sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life
and motion to the whole body.”
Id. at 374 (footnotes omitted) (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 9, 117–21 (Richard Tuck ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)).
30. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 4–5.
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center stage,31 opening the final path for popular sovereignty to represent the
“sole legitimate form for sovereign statehood” as enshrined in the U.N.
Charter.32
Underlying this re-ordering were the colonial empires which had been
steadily built up around the world by Europe’s hegemonic powers, ostensibly
for geostrategic and economic gain, although the latter justification proved
illusory.33 Ironically, as European people were increasingly achieving more
freedom and self-determination within their European states, people in Africa,
Latin America, and Asia coming under colonial control, were losing theirs—
even though a sense of fiduciary duty was embedded at least in colonization
theory,34 if not fully in practice.35 The acquisition of territory drove this
process.
According to Shaw, there are five principal approaches to the acquisition
of territory under international law: “[O]ccupation of terra nullius, prescription,
cession, accretion and subjugation (or conquest).”36 None of which required
European powers to take into account non-European peoples living in acquired
lands. The only counter claims which mattered were those by other Europeans.
Terra nullius, Latin for nobody’s land, is unclaimed territory, prescription is a
method of achieving title after prolonged possession, cession involves the
transfer of territory from one sovereign to another (usually at the end of a war
but also by purchase or grant), accretion is the creation of new territory attached
to existing territory, and subjugation is self-explanatory.37
Regardless of the approach taken, “the method of acquiring additional
territory is by the sovereign exercise of effective control.”38 There is an
establishing phase and a maintaining phase to achieving effective control, even
though the phases are not applied the same ways in different situations:
[I]ts essence is that ‘the continuous and peaceful display of
territorial sovereignty . . . is as good as title.’ Such control has
to be deliberate sovereign action, but what will amount to
effectiveness is relative and will depend upon, for example, the
31. Glanville, supra note 13, at 242. But c.f., Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty:
Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1996) (discussing the steady
erosion of self-determination as an exercisable right into a mere privilege).
32. Glanville, supra note 13, at 243.
33. Avner Offer, The British Empire, 1870–1914: A Waste of Money?, 46 ECON. HIST. REV. 215
(1993).
34. LINDLEY, supra note 20, at 328–36.
35. Glanville, supra note 13, at 244–45.
36. SHAW, supra note 23, at 417.
37. Id. at 419–26.
38. Id. at 441.
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geographical nature of the region, the existence or not of
competing claims and other relevant factors, such as
international reaction. It will not be necessary for such control
to be equally effective throughout the region. . . .
Effectiveness has also a temporal as well as a spatial
dimension . . ., while clearly the public or open nature of the
control is essential. The acquiescence of a party directly
involved is also a very important factor . . . . Where a
dispossessed sovereign disputes the control exercised by a new
sovereign, title can hardly pass. . . . [M]ere possession by force
is not the sole determinant of title.39
European colonial powers mostly used occupation of terra nullus,40
cession, and subjugation to build their empires. But possession did not solve
the question of inherent sovereignty. For that, we must again journey through
time chronologically. While popular sovereignty theory had vested the locus
of this power in the people41 to be granted to a government to act for the state
on their behalf, importantly, little thought was given to people residing in
acquired territory. Non-European inhabitants of acquired territories either had
no sovereignty or the sovereignty they were recognized as having was confined
to internally proscribed enclaves, much like the confinement of Native
Americans to reservations, established under the sovereignty of the national
government.42

39. Id. at 441–42. Thus, for example, Russia’s forceful occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s
Crimea peninsula in 2014 places that territory in Russia’s possession, but so long as Ukraine challenges
this possession, a position backed by a majority of foreign governments recognizing Ukraine’s claim,
title to Crimea has not passed to Russia. See G.A. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014); G.A. Res. A/73/L.47
(Dec. 17, 2018); MATTHEW M. MCMAHON, CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY CONQUEST 14 n.35 (1940) (“The
holding of a conquered territory is regarded as a mere military occupation until its fate shall be
determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the
ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed . . . .” (quoting 1 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 290 (1906)). Over a long period of time in possession,
however, prescription may lead to Russia acquiring title. SHAW, supra note 23, at 446. However, as
recently as the summer of 2021, Western democratic governments continue to challenge Russia’s
claim.
Russian Jets and Ships Shadow British Warship, BBC NEWS, June 23, 2021,
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-57587777 [https://perma.cc/9UE2-3247] (describing the
UK sailing the destroyer H.M.S. Defender within 12 nautical miles of the Crimean coast in the Black
Sea and, despite being harassed by Russian jets with Moscow claiming the ship was in Russian waters,
the UK insisted it was in Ukrainian waters).
40. David Strang, Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism, in
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 31 (Steve Smith ed., 1996).
41. Jameson, supra note 27, at 193–94.
42. Lindley, supra note 20, at 18; Strang, supra note 40, at 31–34.
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It was not until the initial stirrings of what would later become the modern
human rights movement that people were seen to be equal. This recognition of
equality, regardless of race, ethnicity, or national origin, then transposed
popular sovereignty theory alongside it. At that point, colonial powers were
seen to be exercising the sovereignty of the people of their colonial possessions
on behalf of those possessions; thus, the inherent sovereignty of the territory in
question could be considered dormant, or quiescent.
Thus, Jennings begins to consider the question of derivative sovereignty:
“[I]n so far as ‘sovereignty’ is used to mean rights, duties, powers and
competencies or titles it would seem that these might be derived, even in a legal
sense, from another sovereignty.”43 However, once a colony emerged as an
independent state, its full sovereignty was activated, and it could then act with
self-determination in the world on its own behalf.
Despite formalized resolutions and paper processes manifested by the
United Nations in an attempt to manage it, the decolonization process during
the 1940s–70s was a messy and deadly affair. On one extreme, colonial
evacuation coinciding with flawed partition schemes cast diverse populations
in India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine into chaos;44 on the other, Algeria wasn’t
at all sure it didn’t want to integrate into France, and France wasn’t certain it
disagreed with this prospect.45 However, most experiences, with varying
degrees of disorganization, fell somewhere in between.
Implicit recognition of how sovereignty was re-orienting itself from the
starting point of fully supreme colonialism to the ending point of decolonization
is evidenced in some ways by how the British Empire internally restructured
itself across this roughly 200-year period. “At its height, the British Empire
comprised over 13,000,000 square miles—nearly one-quarter of the earth’s
land surface . . . . Britain was responsible for ruling 500 million people, over a
fifth of the earth’s population.”46 By the end of the Second World War, this
had dropped to sixty-two dependencies, and today it includes only a remnant
scattering of overseas islands and enclaves with a total population of about

43. R. Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2017).
44. See Jonathan D. Greenberg, Generations of Memory: Remembering Partition in
India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine, 25 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA, AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST 89 (2005);
Rabia Umar Ali, Planning for the Partition of India 1947: A Scuttled Affair, 30 PAK. J. HIST. &
CULTURE 113 (2009).
45. Chimène I. Keitner & W. Michael Reisman, Free Association: The United States Experience,
39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (2003); Ali A. Mazrui, Consent, Colonialism, and Sovereignty, 11 POL. STUD.
36 n.4 (1963); Hans J. Morgenthau, Asia: The American Algeria, 32 PUB. AFF. 43 (July 1, 1961).
46. ASHLEY JACKSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1 (2013).
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300,000.47 So pervasive was the Empire that over 80% of modern states in the
world were affected by it. Indeed, today there are only twenty-two countries
that Britain did not invade at some point in history.48
Constitutional disagreement within the Empire, in fully articulated form,
began in the 1770s with the American Revolution. The Crown’s view was not
only that its sovereignty was supreme over the British colonies, but that
Parliamentary supremacy extended throughout the entirety of the Empire as
well.49 While the American view acknowledged the Crown’s external
sovereignty, it denied Parliamentary supremacy—eschewing it in favor of the
power of colonial assemblies as expressions of colonial sovereignty under the
Crown.50 As Madison put it:
The fundamental principle of the Revolution was, that the
Colonies were coordinate members with each other and with
Great Britain, of an empire united by a common executive
sovereign, but not united by any common legislative sovereign.
The legislative power was maintained to be as complete in each
American Parliament, as in the British Parliament. And the
royal prerogative was in force in each Colony by virtue of its
acknowledging the King for its executive magistrate, as it was
in Great Britain by virtue of a like acknowledgement there. A
denial of these principles by Great Britain, and the assertion of
them by America, produced the Revolution.51
Even “Adam Smith thought that the American colonies were an asset, but
that the effort to govern them from London was folly.”52 America’s break with
Britain may have proved the point. By 1839, Parliament was coming around to
this general proposition, faced with further discontent in the colonies and
dominions stemming from constant and unnecessary friction between
centralized executive administration through London’s Colonial Office and
local colonial legislatures. In his influential report to Parliament, Lord Durham
suggested home rule for the British colonies was the best path for the
preservation of the empire.53 The division between what each colony should
47. BARRY E. CARTER, ALLEN S. WEINER & DUNCAN B. HOLLIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 490
(7th ed. 2018).
48. STUART LAYCOCK, ALL THE COUNTRIES WE’VE EVERY INVADED: AND THE FEW WE
NEVER GOT ROUND TO 4 (2012).
49. Stanley N. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 25 (Richard
R. Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward Carlos Carter II, eds., 1987).
50. ROBERT LIVINGSTON SHUYLER, PARLIAMENT AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE 194–96 (1929).
51. Id. at 196.
52. Offer, supra note 33, at 215.
53. SHUYLER, supra note 50, at 199–210.
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decide for itself and what Britain should decide for it fell roughly along
internal/external lines:
Perfectly aware of the value of our colonial possessions, and
strongly impressed with the necessity of maintaining our
connexion with them, I know not in what respect it can be
desirable that we should interfere with their internal legislation
in matters which do not affect their relations with the mother
country. The matters, which so concern us, are very few. The
constitution of the form of government,—the regulation of
foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the
other British Colonies, and foreign nations,—and the disposal
of the public lands, are the only points on which the mother
country requires control.54
This formula eventually took expression in various ways throughout the
Empire, for instance while in dominions such as Canada or Australia, “the
British Parliament has ceased to be an Imperial Parliament in any real sense of
that term,” in the 1919 Government of India Act, Parliament noted the basis of
the Indian constitution as providing for “the gradual development of selfgoverning institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible
government.”55
By 1926, as the foundation stones of the British
Commonwealth were being laid, this internal/external division of sovereignty
was more expressly stated,56 although even by then South Africa, Australia,
Canada, India, and New Zealand were signing the Treaty of Versailles which
in itself manifested some component of external capacity.57
Consequently, certain colonies could exercise the internal aspect of their
sovereignty to run their own affairs, while the colonial power would exercise
that colony’s external aspect of sovereignty—much as the practice has
continued today with respect to failed states, wherein an external state or group
of states, or even an international organization, may exercise the failed or
collapsed state’s external sovereignty on that state’s behalf during its period of
failure or collapse.58

54. Id. at 205.
55. Id. at 194–95.
56. Id. at 194–97, 222.
57. T. Baty, Sovereign Colonies, 34 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (1921).
58. Kenneth Chan, State Failure and the Changing Face of the Jus ad Bellum, 18 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 395, 407–09 (2013) (discussing the examples of Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan).
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Finally, post-World War II decolonization accorded that second aspect,
external sovereignty, to new states realizing their full sovereignty.59 Public
international law was altered to reflect equitable considerations for such newly
sovereign states, such as development of the “clean slate” doctrine which
enabled new states to emerge unencumbered by treaties entered into or public
debts incurred by former colonial powers.60 Structurally, for former British
colonies, membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations accorded them
favored immigration and trade rights as well.61
B. The American Experience
As colonies themselves, the United States certainly possessed an informed
perspective of what sovereignty meant to them.62 The key driving forces
leading to the Revolutionary War and the break from Great Britain revolved
around questions of representation, self-determination, and autonomy. Like the
U.S. Virgin Islands with respect to Congress, as colonies neither Virginia nor
New York nor any other British North American colony had a vote in the British
Parliament. Even so, colonial Americans may have been willing to forego such
representation and gone along with an internal/external form of their own
quiescent sovereignty if the Crown had been willing to acknowledge a limit to
Parliament’s power and offered recognition of the kind of internal colonial selfgovernance that Britain eventually accepted much later:63
[B]y 1774 [Americans] developed the notion that, although
Parliament had no legal authority to legislate for [the] colonies
outside the realm, an exception could be made for the
regulation of imperial trade (“one expressly declared to be not
of right but only by way of voluntary concession”) by colonial
consent (“except in matters of ‘internal polity’”).64

59. Although between 1870 and 1987, “130 colonial dependencies of Western states became
recognized independent states or were fully incorporated as parts of sovereign states,” it was the postwar era from 1946–1986 that brought the decolonization process to its fullest flower. See David Strang,
From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization 1870–1987, 55 AM.
SOC’L REV. 846, 846, 850 fig. 1 (1990).
60. CARTER, supra note 47, at 482–87.
61. See Paul L. Robertson & John Singleton, The Commonwealth as an Economic Network, 41
AUSTL. ECON. HIST. REV. 241 (2001).
62. See Katz, supra note 49 (discussing emerging notions of American national sovereignty).
But cf. Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical Study, 12 AM.
HIST. REV. 529 (1907) (arguing against a national conception of American sovereignty).
63. Katz, supra note 49, at 25–26; Gordon S. Wood, The Problem of Sovereignty, 68 WM. &
MARY Q. 573, 573–75 (2011).
64. Katz, supra note 49, at 25.
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However, Britain was steadfast in its assertion “there was nothing beyond
the power of the English Parliament,”65 and the ensuing struggle birthed the
United States—a fact ultimately recognized by the Crown in 1783’s Treaty of
Paris.66 From inception as a new country, the United States established and set
aside territories, such as the Northwest Territory,67 that would eventually be
subdivided into new states joining the Union on an equal footing with the
original thirteen68—for example, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and
Wisconsin. As a state in the Westphalian sense, within the international legal
system, the United States relied on the traditional approaches to territorial
acquisition available to it under customary international law, but the question
of domestic legal authority to do so was not as clear.
The U.S. Constitution did not expressly authorize the federal government
to acquire territory.69 In fact, President Jefferson “expressed the opinion that
Louisiana could not be acquired under the existing Constitution, and
accordingly recommended its amendment.”70 However, when that solution was
not forthcoming, Jefferson proceeded with the Louisiana Purchase under the
theory of implied constitutional authority71—an authority that was endorsed by
the U.S. Supreme Court72 and has not been seriously questioned since.
Unlike European states, driven by a desire to expand and consolidate global
colonial assets, the 19th Century acquisition of territory by the United States
was not in furtherance of creating a colonial empire, but to create the country.73
The systematic acquisition of territories, followed by organization of those
65. Id. (quoting C.H. MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTION
INTERPRETATION 16 (1958)).
66. Treaty of Paris, U.S.–Great Britain, art. I, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
67. See the Nw. Ordinance of July 13, 1787, collected as one of four Organic Laws of the U.S.
in the preface to the U.S. Code. 1 U.S.C. §§ XLV–LXXV (2012). For the Nw. Ordinance’s original
text, see 32 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 334–43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936).
After adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the Ordinance was brought into conformity with the new
legislative system through reenactment by Congress with minor revisions. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789,
ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51–53 (1789).
68. Matthew J. Hegreness, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820, 1823
n. 4 (2011).
69. Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and
Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 399 (1898–99); Frank J.
R. Mitchell, The Legal Effect of the Acquisition of the Philippine Islands, 39 AM. L. REG. 193, 194
(1900).
70. Mitchell, supra note 69, at 195.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 196; Carlos Iván Gorrín Peralta, Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Territories:
Expansion, Colonialism, and Self-Determination, 46 STETSON L. REV. 233, 237 (2017).
73. Peralta, supra note 72, at 238.
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territories, incorporation, and then finally statehood, was a fairly linear legal
path established by Congress. In addition to purchase and cession of territories
via treaties with Native American tribes, Figure 1 demonstrates the mixture of
approaches to territorial acquisition of land in North America from European
powers, utilized by the United States for this purpose: cession, purchase, and
occupation. Indeed, in many cases overlapping techniques ensued, such as
cession via treaty from a European power of their rights to the territory and near
simultaneous purchase via treaty from Indian nations living on those same
lands.

Figure 1: 19th Century Continental United States Territorial Acquisitions74
Other 19th Century U.S. territorial acquisitions included Alaska, by
purchase from Russia,75 and Hawaii, ultimately by subjugation.76 With a view
toward expanding the country instead of colonizing distant locales, the federal

74. Territorial Gains by the U.S., in THE MAKING OF AMERICA (Nat’l Geographic Soc’y 2002)
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/photo/territorial-gains/ [https://perma.cc/QB3S-EFXF].
75. William L. Iggiagruk Hensley, There are Two Versions of the Story of How the U.S.
Purchased Alaska from Russia: The Tale of ‘Seward’s Folly’ Must Also Be Seen Through the Eyes of
Alaska’s Native Populations, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Mar. 29, 2017.
76. Thomas J. Osborne, The Main Reason for Hawaiian Annexation in July, 1898, 71 OR. HIST.
Q. 161, 164 (June 1970).
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government’s view of sovereignty over territories on their way to statehood was
one of more direct control. Prior to the American Civil War, that control
included, for instance, deciding which territories would be set aside as free or
slave-holding, as Figure 2 depicts, under the 1854 Kansas–Nebraska Act77—
repealing the Compromise of 1850,78 which had allowed some of the territories
to decide this question for themselves.

Figure 2: Designation of Slave-holding Status in Western Territories Under
1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act79
As America moved into the modern era, it acquired more territories through
cession in the wake of wartime victories. While the American experience of
territorial acquisition did not exactly match the European experience of colonial
expansion, there are nevertheless undeniable geostrategic benefits to America’s
maintaining territories abroad. During the period of world wars and the Cold
War, deployment of military bases and assets sufficient to enforce U.S. interests
77. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277, 33rd Cong. (1854).
78. See Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 845, 882 (2011).
79. Kansas-Nebraska Act, in THE MAKING OF AMERICA (Nat’l Geographic Soc’y 2002)
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/photo/kansas-nebraska-act/ [https://perma.cc/M3E7-FM57].
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abroad was a paramount national security focus, and U.S. Territories facilitated
that purpose—which continues today.80 Moreover, potential for furtherance of
economic interests should not be underestimated. In the latter case, one need
only consider the amount of ocean U.S. Territories (both inhabited and
uninhabited) bring under the United States’ jurisdiction, depicted in Figure 3
below, through the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime under the United
National Law of the Sea Convention.81

Figure 3: U.S. Exclusive Economic Zones82
Once acquired, governance of overseas territories was not seriously
questioned, but the rights of the people on the inhabited islands became
problematic. Even if most of them were or would become U.S. citizens, were

80. Alexander B. Gray & Douglas W. Domenech, U.S. Territories: The Frontlines of Global
Competition with China, REALCLEAR DEFENSE, Mar. 11, 2021 (“U.S. territories and possessions
remain as strategically significant as they were when originally obtained.”).
81. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
82. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], United States Exclusive
Economic Zones (2011), https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/2011/012711_gcil_maritime_eez_map.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4GSB-3CPA].
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they entitled to all of the constitutional rights of their fellow citizens living in
the states? The Supreme Court, in a series of cases dealing with the territories
acquired in 1898 known as the Insular Cases, devised a methodology, or
perhaps a legal justification, to catch up with what Congress was already doing
in the early 20th Century to address the issue that was both a dichotomy and a
functionality in character.83
The dichotomy consisted of classifying a U.S. Territory as either
incorporated or unincorporated.84
Incorporated territories were those
considered by Congress to be on the path to statehood; unincorporated
territories were not on the path to statehood—in fact, they might be on the path
to independence and therefore only to be governed by the United States
temporarily.85 The Constitution applied in full to incorporated territories, but
only selectively, based upon which fundamental rights Congress wished to
extend, in the unincorporated territories86—which today include the five
inhabited U.S. Territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa.
The functional approach determined which of the constitutional rights
extended to these territories on a right-by-right basis.87 Justice Kennedy
continued to use this approach as recently as 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush,88
deciding whether the right of habeas corpus applied to detainees at the U.S.
military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba:
The Boumediene opinion indicates by example some of the
factors that might make the enforcement of a familiar right in
an unfamiliar location “impracticable and anomalous.” One is
its cultural inappropriateness, as illustrated by the hesitancy to
impose common law procedures on a population accustomed
to the civil law in the Insular Cases. Another is the tendency
of the right to interfere with intergovernmental cooperation in
contexts where the United States cannot operate unilaterally.
Third, there are logistical constraints that may result from
83. Peralta, supra note 72, at 241–42.
84. Id.
85. Gustavo A. Gelpí, Comment on Blocher & Gulati’s ‘Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession’,
43 YALE J. INT’L L.F. 1, 2 (2018).
86. Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 259, 264 (2009) (“[T]he Insular Cases doctrine extended only a subset of ‘fundamental’
constitutional rights to so-called “unincorporated territories” not expected to become states of the
Union.”).
87. Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [that] Follows the Flag . . . But
Doesn’t Quite Catch Up with It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. Bush, 80 MISS. L.J. 181,
187 (2010).
88. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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distance or from the disorder prevailing in the location where
the right would be enforced. This list is not necessarily
exhaustive. These considerations justify the functional
approach, partly on practical grounds, and partly because by
now it is embedded in our constitutional doctrine.89
In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy overlayed the functional approach with “a
nontextual, normative valuation of the importance of the particular right under
consideration.”90 Justice Kennedy recalled “the ‘fundamental’ character of the
(selected) rights extended to overseas territories under the Insular Cases and
characterize[d] habeas corpus as ‘fundamental’ in his closing paragraphs.
These distinctions underline his statement that the functional approach allowed
the Court ‘to use its power sparingly and where it would be most needed.’”91
Validating this approach, however, comes with significant racial baggage.
Although the United States had emerged from the blight of slavery after a
protracted struggle, racism was still very much the order of the day at the turn
of the 19th Century when the Insular Cases were decided. America’s federal
institutions were not immune from reflecting that reality. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s judgments in Native American cases and the Chinese exclusion cases
were rife with racist pronouncements concerning the “otherness” of the people
involved.92 In this context, the tone of the Insular Cases should come as no
surprise:
Similar characterizations of the peoples of the new territories
bestrew the pages of the Insular Cases. The doctrinal
innovation of the cases was the distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated territories. But that question
was deemed to turn on congressional intent, as manifested in
treaties and legislation, and there was no doubt that the
congressional judgment was based largely on the race and
perceived level of civilization of the inhabitants of the newly
acquired territories. Areas populated by “barbarians” not
thought fit for full U.S. membership were found not to have
been incorporated into the United States, and those persons
living in such territories were therefore not entitled to full
constitutional protection.93
In 2020, when presented an opportunity in Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for
P.R. v. A

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Neuman, supra note 86, at 269.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 273.
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
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urelius Inv., LLC.94 to overrule the widely-criticized Insular Cases, which
Justice Breyer admitted during oral arguments hung like “a dark cloud” over
Territorial status, the Court demurred, opting to find that old case law simply
did not apply to the facts before them.95 Consequently, while questioned, the
Insular Cases still lurk around the constitutional corner, haunting the legal
relationship between the United States and its Territories.
Indeed, one could say America’s Insular Cases in some ways mimicked
Great Britain’s division of its legal order between one designed for those living
in Great Britain proper, and a separate, lesser one, for those living in the
colonial empire:
When the U.S. starts claiming large populated overseas
territories, it starts defining itself as a legal entity and its body
of law differently through a series of court cases known as the
Insular Cases. The Supreme Court rules that the Constitution,
which one might previously have assumed applied to the entire
country, actually was restricted in this application. The United
States went out to the Philippines and up to Alaska, but the
Constitution didn’t follow it to all of those places. That was
accommodating empire by dealing with this potential paradox
between being, at the one end, a republic, and the other, an
empire. The way to handle this was through a legal split
whereby there’s one part of the country that’s governed by the
Constitution, and there’s an extra-constitutional zone that’s
governed by a different set of laws.96
The American experience, adapted to our own unique constitutional federal
system, certainly draws upon the historical roots of colonial and territorial
sovereignty theory, but does so tentatively. At least one reason for this is our
national ethos, woven across centuries, that includes both implicit and explicit
(but always vague) promises of self-determination. U.S. Territories typically
can opt for independence (either complete or freely associated with the United
States), status quo as a Territory, or incorporation as a state. Various plebiscites
have offered these options with varying results.
America’s acquisitions of two groups of territories offer convenient case
studies on our (1) acquisition of territories, and (2) sovereignty-based options
for continuance of or emergence from territorial status. Both are the result of
cession by defeated states. After the Spanish-American War, the United States
gained control of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, and Cuba: the first two
94. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020).
95. Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux & Neil C. Weare, After Aurelius: What Future for the Insular
Cases?, 130 YLJ F. 284, 285–86 (Nov. 2, 2020).
96. Diamond, supra note 11.
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remain with the U.S. as territories, the latter two are completely independent.
Then, after the Second World War, the United States came into possession of a
large swath of the Pacific Ocean that would become the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands. Of the island regions therein, one remains a U.S. Territory, and
three emerged as independent states freely associated with the United States.
With the first example, there was no uniform approach to American control
of the four Spanish colonies ceded by Spain to the U.S. in 1898. While Cuba
was thought from the beginning to be on a very quick path to independence,
indeed that was much of the American public and political sentiment for going
to war in the first place, there was disagreement over self-governance and
independence for the Philippines, and not much thought at all beyond territorial
status for Guam and Puerto Rico.97
The second example stems from America’s post-war acquisition from
Japan of what would become the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Comprised of the Caroline Islands, Marshall Islands, and Northern Mariana
Islands, this area of the North Pacific known as Micronesia passed, during the
course of four centuries, through a series of cessions from Spain to Germany to
Japan and then to the United States:98
Micronesian sentiment over this state of affairs is perhaps best
expressed by an ancient Saipanese, whose attitude is the soul
of pragmatism: “In my youth I learned Spanish and German.
At middle age I learned Japanese and now, in my old age, I
find myself taking English lessons. I wonder, will I someday
have to learn Russian?”99
Geographically, the trust area encompassed 2,141 islands spread over 5%
of the Pacific Ocean—a zone equivalent in size to the continental United
States.100 Populationally, only 100 of the islands were inhabited with a
combined count of approximately 100,000 people whom derived from very
different ethnic backgrounds: Chamorros, Marshallese and Palauans, Trukese,
Yapese, Ponapeans, and Kusaieans.101 The U.N. Security Council approved
this cessation in 1947 as a strategic trust territory wherein the United States
agreed to develop political institutions, promote self-determination and

97. Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
57, 65 n.30 (2013).
98. Keitner & Reisman, supra note 45, at 33–34.
99. Harry W. Bergbauer, Jr., A Review of the Political Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific,
22 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 43, 47 (1970).
100. Id. at 43.
101. Id.
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economic self-sufficiency, and instill social and educational advancement.102
Trusteeships under the U.N. system aligned more specifically with popular
sovereignty theory than previous territorial arrangements. “An international
trusteeship may be seen as conceptually parsing the inhabitants’ inherent, or
residual, territorial sovereignty from their capacity to exercise such
sovereignty’s attributes.”103 American trusteeship lasted until 1994.104
Although the United States encouraged all those within the Trust Territory
of the Pacific to emerge from the trusteeship as one state, this large area was by
no means a homogenous society;105 strong ethnically-based self-determination
movements within each region ensured that would not be the case.106 As the
Trust Territory of the Pacific broke apart into distinct political units over a
multi-year period, it did so along the lines of absorption or independence.107
The Northern Mariana Islands—with a population of approximately
74,600, spread over fourteen islands, in the North Pacific three-quarters of the
way from Hawaii to the Philippines—voted by 78% in 1975 to join the United
States as a U.S. Territory in the style of a commonwealth, which they did two
years later.108 Although the resulting covenant between the Northern Mariana
Islands and the United States described it as being “in political union with and
under the sovereignty of the United States,” Congress read its relative power
under the Constitution’s territorial clause broadly “with full sovereignty vested
in the United States, and the plenary legislative authority vested in the United
States Congress,” while the Islands read it narrowly, noting “[n]either Congress
nor any other . . . agency of the United States Government may utilize the
territorial clause or any other source of power . . . to supersede the sovereign
power of the CNMI to control and regulate matters of local concern.”109
The locus of sovereignty lies somewhere in between, and certainly
recognizes popular sovereignty theory:
As used in connection with the insular political communities
affiliated with the United States, the concept of a
102. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess.,
124th mtg. at 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/318 (Apr. 2, 1947).
103. Isenberg, supra note 20, at 220.
104. CARTER, WEINER & HOLLIS, supra note 47, at 492–93.
105. Harry G. Prince, The United States, The United Nations, and Micronesia: Questions of
Procedure, Substance, and Faith, 11 MICH. J. INT’L L., 11, 36 (1989).
106. James Robert Arnett II, The American Legal System and Micronesian Customary Law: The
Legal Legacy of the United States to the New Nations of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 4
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 161, 164–65 (1985).
107. See generally Prince, supra note 105.
108. Keitner & Reisman, supra note 45, at 38–40.
109. Id. at 41–42.
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“commonwealth” anticipates a substantial amount of selfgovernment (over internal matters) and some degree of
autonomy on the part of the entity so designated. The
commonwealth derives its authority not only from the United
States Congress, but also by the consent of the citizens of the
entity.110
Both the Republic of the Marshall Islands, comprised of five islands and
twenty-nine atolls with a population of approximately 70,800, and the
Federated States of Micronesia, comprised of 607 islands and a population of
135,869, emerged from the Trust Territory as independent states in free
association with the United States.111 Both negotiated compacts of free
association with the United States, under which they retain plenary authority
for self-governance and carry on their own foreign affairs, but the United States
would continue economic support and carry on the security and defense affairs
of the new states—which includes the right of the United States to “deny access
there to any nation that the United States considers a threat.”112 These
arrangements were approved by plebiscites in each state in 1983 and signed
into U.S. law in 1986.113
Palau, comprised of 200 islands with a population of approximately 20,000
living on eight of them, also opted for independence with free association, but
took a more convoluted path.114 Palauans rejected an effort aimed at joining
the Federated States of Micronesia in the 1970s and embarked on a politically
tumultuous journey during the 1980s and early 90s.115 That journey set an
unreachably high bar for Paluauns to approve a compact with the United States
that allowed for the “use, testing, storage or disposal of nuclear, toxic, chemical,
gas or biological weapons” that was read by its Supreme Court to include transit
of nuclear-powered U.S. naval vessels.116 Eventually, Palau did approve the
compact and entered into free association with the United States along lines
similar to that of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia in 1994.117
Both examples offer not only guidance on the paths that a flexible evolution
of quiescent to full sovereignty can take but also demonstrate the international
legal components (mostly treaty-based) between points of acquisition and
110. Id. at 42 (quoting Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United
States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 451 (1992)).
111. Id. at 45–46, 48–50.
112. CARTER, WEINER & HOLLIS, supra note 47, at 492–93.
113. Keitner & Reisman, supra note 45, at 48–50.
114. Id. at 46, 50–51.
115. Id. at 50.
116. Id. at 50–51.
117. Id.
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disposition of territories. Section III discusses the status of territories that
remain with the United States.
III. QUIESCENT SOVEREIGNTY OF U.S. TERRITORIES
The United States possesses sixteen territories or claimed territories beyond
the external borders of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii.118
America’s governance of these territories is pursuant to the Territorial Clause
of the U.S. Constitution which provides: “The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State.”119 Of these sixteen territories, five are
inhabited: Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and
the Northern Marianas Islands.120 Except for American Samoa, the inhabited
Territories are considered organized but “unincorporated,” meaning they are
not imminently on their way to statehood.121
To restate the central premise of popular sovereignty theorists, sovereignty
in the modern world rests with the people. “In the modern era, the sovereign is
always the people . . . .”122 It is a bottom-up proposition, not top-down. As
President Biden noted after the U.S.-Russian summit in 2021, “We don’t derive
our rights from the government. We possess them because we’re born period
and we yield them to a government.”123 Therefore, the sovereignty of the
people living in U.S. Territories rests with them, not with the United States—a
point expressly acknowledged, for example, in the Puerto Rican Constitution.124
118. Cole Edick, Relics of Colonialism: Overseas Territories Across the Globe, 37 HARV. INT’L
REV. 11 (Fall 2015).
119. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3.
120. Ann M. Simmons, American Samoans Aren’t Actually U.S. Citizens. Does that Violate the
Constitution?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://latimes.com/nation/la-na-americansamoan-citizenship-explainer-20180406-story.html [https://perma.cc/7BD5-D45C].
121. Id.
122. Paul W. Kahn, The Question of Sovereignty, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 259, 262 (2004).
123. Joe Biden Transcript After Meeting with Putin, REV, June 16, 2021,
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/joe-biden-press-conference-transcript-after-meeting-with-putin
[https://perma.cc/Z5X2-JASQ].
124. P.R. Const. art. I, § 1 (“The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is hereby constituted. Its
political power emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their will, within
the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of
America.”); P.R. Const. art. I, § 2 (“The government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be
republican in form and its legislative, judicial and executive branches as established by this
Constitution shall be equally subordinate to the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico.”). Notably,
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Nevertheless, the United States maintains possession of the territories they
reside in, acquired title to those territories in a variety of ways, and also
continues to exercise sovereignty on their behalf in a variety of ways—mostly
externally now instead of internally. As Crawford notes:
The question of sovereignty in international law [should not]
be confused with the constitutional lawyer’s question of
supreme competence within a particular State . . . . Nor is it to
be confused with the exercise of ‘sovereign rights’: a State may
continue to be sovereign even though important governmental
functions are carried out on its behalf by another State or by an
international organization.125
Quiescent sovereignty describes the latter arrangement. As outlined in
more detail below, internally, self-governance has become the norm for U.S.
Territories, while externally, decisions rest with the federal government.126 The
Restatement’s definition of sovereignty makes room for this arrangement of the
Territory exercising internal sovereignty while the United States exercises the
external aspect: “‘Sovereignty’ is a term used in many senses and is much
abused. . . . [I]t implies a state’s lawful control over its territory generally to
the exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that territory, and authority
to apply law there.”127
In the old model, the United States established internal governing
structures128—appointing governors such as future president William Howard
Taft in the Philippines for example—to exert more direct control of the
territory.129 Congress could decide what to do with a particular territory largely

American Samoans rejected language offered in 2010 to revise the 1967 revised American Samoan
Constitution that recounted the cessation of sovereignty from Samoan tribal chieftains to the United
States. See Final Draft of 2010 Amendments to the 1967 Revised Constitution of American Samoa
(June 21 – July 3, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20110716140622/http://americansamoa.gov/sit
es/default/files/concon/Final_Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/36NL-NGLN].
125. CRAWFORD, supra note 14, at 33.
126. Although internal governance of U.S. Territories has moved from the model of a
government imposed by Washington D.C. to a model of self-governance, the U.S. Supreme Court
recently reminded us that the Territories continue to reside in a dependency status. See Puerto Rico v.
Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016).
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 206 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1987).
128. Mitchell, supra note 69, at 197–210.
129. BONIFACIO S. SALAMANCA, THE FILIPINO REACTION TO AMERICAN RULE 1901–1913
(1970).
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without triggering popular sovereignty concerns,130 such as unilaterally
disposing of a territory via independence:
The once-U.S. territory was acquired from Spain along with
Puerto Rico and Guam in 1898. In 1916 Congress granted the
Philippines autonomy.
In 1935 it established the
Commonwealth of the Philippines as a transition to
independence. Finally, in 1946 the Philippines became an
independent sovereign. At no point did the people of the
Philippines vote for independence.131
Congress now takes into account the voice of the people in the Territories,
albeit not nearly enough. Administratively, although it is Congress’s power
that is plenary,132 much as in the case of America’s relationship with federally
recognized Tribes,133 the executive branch handles territorial governance issues
—first under the Navy, when the Territories were acquired, but now under the
Department of Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs (OIA),134 with the exception
of Puerto Rico, whose affairs are managed directly by the Office of the Deputy
Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs.135
America’s populated Territories exist along a flexible, not fixed,
sovereignty spectrum136 running from states at the top end to unpopulated
territories and federal enclaves at the bottom end. If sovereignty means power
in terms of decision-making authority, then constitutionally, the United States
130. Mitchell, supra note 69, at 197–210. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 19th Century view
analogized the relationship between territories and the federal government to that between counties
and their state governments. As Chief Justice Chase explained:
All territory within the jurisdiction of the United States, not included in any State
must necessarily be governed by or under the authority of Congress. The
territories are but political subdivisions of the outlying dominion of the United
States. Their relation to the general government is much the same as that which
counties bear to the respective States, and Congress may legislate for them as a
State does for its municipal organizations. The organic law of a Territory takes
the place of a constitution as the fundamental law of the local government.
Id. at 204 (quoting National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880)).
131. Gelpí, supra note 85, at 4–5 (footnotes omitted).
132. Lin, supra note 12, at 1264–65.
133. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) (“Congress has plenary authority to
legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters, including their form of government.”).
134. H.R. Rep. No. 111-357, at 3 (2009), https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/hrpt357/CRPT111hrpt357.pdf [https://perma.cc/6862-MLFN].
135. THE OFFICE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/iga/
[https://perma.cc/P5RQ-6MZ8].
136. A spectrum analysis is most useful for plotting types of sovereignty exercised by political
sub-units in the U.S. federal system, especially with respect to territories. See, e.g., Keitner & Reisman,
supra note 45, at 41 (quoting Marybeth Herald, The Northern Mariana Islands: A Change in the
Course Under Its Covenant with the United States, 71 OR. L. REV. 127, 135 (1992)), 63 (Appendix).
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has the most, followed by federally recognized Native American tribes,
described by John Marshall as “domestic dependent nations”—which under
federal preemption power hold state jurisdictions at bay.137 As Figure 4 depicts,
the five inhabited Territories (from commonwealths to unorganized) occupy the
middle ground on America’s sovereignty spectrum.
The District of Columbia is next with much less decision-making authority
than the Territories. Like Territorial representatives, D.C.’s has a non-voting
representative in Congress, and like Territorial residents, D.C. residents cannot
vote for president.138 However, unlike Territorial residents, D.C. residents are
taxed.139 Moreover, under the 1973 Home Rule Act, Congress retains control
over D.C.’s budget, the president appoints all judges serving on D.C.’s superior
court, and the laws passed by D.C.’s city council are reviewed directly by
Congress—who can overturn them, which it has five times between 1988 and
2014.140 Thus, D.C., ironically the seat of the federal government, arguably has
less quiescent sovereignty than any of the U.S. Territories which lie thousands
of miles from Washington.
At the lower end are uninhabited territories, which are subject to exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Last are federal enclaves, also uninhabited—which
typically consist of national parks, forests, and monuments and which,
depending on the particular enclave, can give rise to either exclusive federal
jurisdiction or concurrent state and federal jurisdiction.141

137. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 3, at 19.
138. See Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional Representation for
the District of Columbia: Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill in Light of Section
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the District, 60 ALA. L. REV.
783 (2009).
139. Id. at 817.
140. D.C. Code § 1-201.01 (1973).
141. See Emily S. Miller, The Strongest Defense You’ve Never Heard of: The Constitution’s
Federal Enclave Doctrine and Its Effect on Litigants, States, and Congress, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 73, 73–74 (2011).

KELLY_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

QUIESCENT SOVEREIGNTY OF U.S. TERRITORIES

529

Figure 4: Spectrum of Legal Entities under U.S. Federal Government
Among the unincorporated organized U.S. Territories, Puerto Rico and
Guam are the oldest. Both were ceded to the United States in 1899 after the
Spanish American War under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.142

142. Treaty of Paris, U.S.–Spain, art. II, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
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Figure 5: Puerto Rico143
Puerto Rico is the largest of the Territories, with a population of
approximately 3.7 million—“a population larger than twenty-one of the States
in the Union.”144 Lying in the eastern portion of the Caribbean Island chain,
Puerto Rico, with its deep-water port in San Juan, was long-prized by Spain as
the gateway to its empire in the Western Hemisphere.145 Puerto Ricans became
U.S. citizens in 1917,146 and since 1950 the island has been governed under the
Federal Relations Act.147 Puerto Rico adopted its own constitution in 1952 and
since then has elected its own Governor and maintains a bicameral
legislature.148
As noted above, Puerto Rico is a self-governing
commonwealth.149 Periodically, and very recently, Puerto Ricans have
supported statehood for the island and various bills have been introduced in
Congress to that effect, but no significant backing has emerged for
independence.150
143. Puerto
Rico,
POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY
NOW
(Oct.
29,
2020),
https://www.polgeonow.com/2012/11/what-is-puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/3GZB-HK4K].
144. Lin, supra note 12, at 1256.
145. C.R. Kutz, The Defense of Spain’s Colonial Empire, 29 MIL. ENG’R 351, 352 (Sept.–Oct.
1937).
146. Jones–Shafroth Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 368, § 5, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917).
147. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (1950).
148. U.N. Secretary of the Interior, Letter dated Oct. 9, 1952, from the Acting Secretary of the
Interior to the Secretary of State, U.N. Doc. 711C.02/10-952 (Oct. 9, 1952).
149. Id.; R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44721, POLITICAL STATUS OF PUERTO
RICO: BRIEF BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONGRESS 5 (2017).
150. Syra Ortiz-Blanes & Bianca Padró Ocasio, Could Puerto Rico Become a U.S. State? New
Bill in Congress Faces an Uphill Battle, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 2, 2021.
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Figure 6: Guam151
Southernmost of the Mariana Islands, and the largest island geographically
part of Micronesia, Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States.
Having settled the island 3,500 years ago, the Chamorro are considered the
indigenous people of Guam.152 Those born on the island are U.S. citizens under
the 1950 Organic Act of Guam.153 With a population of approximately 160,000
(37% Chamorro), Guam elects its own governor and a unicameral legislature.154
There was a failed attempt in the 1980s to achieve commonwealth status like
Puerto Rico and the Northern Marianas Islands.155 As commonwealth status
typically implies more de jure internal self-governance, Guam (along with the
U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa) is technically not considered selfgoverning from an international and decolonization perspective; therefore, it is
151. JUSTYNA GOWOROWSKA & STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P23-213, RECENT
POPULATION TRENDS FOR THE U.S. ISLAND AREAS: 2000 TO 2010 6 (2015).
152. Joseph E. Fallon, Federal Policy and U.S. Territories: The Political Restructuring of the
United States of America, 64 PAC. AFF. 23, 38 (1991).
153. Organic Act of Guam, Pub. L. No. 81-630, § 206, 64 Stat. 384 (1950).
154. Lin, supra note 12, at 1257.
155. Jon M. Van Dyke, Carmen Di Amore-Siah & Gerald W. Berkley-Coats, Self-Determination
for Non-Self-Governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of Guam and Hawai’i, 18 U.
HAW. L. REV. 623, 626–28 (1996).
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still listed with seventeen other dependencies on the U.N. Register of Non-SelfGoverning Territories.156

Figure 7: U.S. Virgin Islands157
In 1917, the United States purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark for
$25 million.158 A mostly Afro-Caribbean population of approximately 100,000
live on the three main islands of St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas.159
Congress’ 1954 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands is the statutory basis
for the Territory’s organization160 and those born on the islands have U.S.
citizenship.161 Since 1970, islanders have elected their own governor and their
local interests are represented in a popularly elected unicameral legislature.162
The islands have been unable to produce a local constitution despite five

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Lin, supra note 12, at 1265–66.
GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 151, at 8.
Lin, supra note 12, at 1260.
GOWOROWSKA AND WILSON, supra note 151, at 13, 18.
Revised Organic Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-517, § 2, 68 Stat. 497 (1954).
Lin, supra note 12, at 1260.
Id.
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attempts,163 but a 2020 referendum resulted in a 72% approval for attempting
to do so once again.164

Figure 8: Northern Mariana Islands165
The last unincorporated organized U.S. Territory is the Northern Mariana
Islands. During the 1970s, as units within the Trust Territory of the Pacific
were deciding what their future status would be, the Northern Mariana Islands
elected to remain with the United States and entered into a covenant
establishing them as a commonwealth in political union with the United
States,166 which subsequently led to them formally joining the United States in
1986. Like nearby Guam, it is home to a large Chamorro population (about
25%), with a total population of just over 50,000 living on the main islands of
Saipan, Tinian, and Rota out of a total of fourteen islands that are the

163. Id. at 1260–61.
164. A.J. Rao, Voters Overwhelmingly Push for Sixth Constitutional Convention, V.I. DAILY
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/news/voters-overwhelming-push-forsixth-constitutional-convention/article_ad866ad1-2a36-51ed-b668-712da7e9175b.html
[https://perma.cc/9GNH-KRGK].
165. GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 151, at 7.
166. Lin, supra note 12, at 1262.
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northernmost in the Mariana Archipelago.167 Northern Marianans are U.S.
citizens and elect their own governor and bicameral legislature.168
Unlike the other Territories, American Samoa is both unincorporated and
unorganized.169 Due west of Australia, American Samoa is the southernmost
U.S. possession. With five main islands, it has a population of approximately
50,000 people,170 almost 90% of which are ethnically Samoan. After much
contesting among the United States and European powers over this strategic
South Pacific area, American Samoa (the name chosen by the people therein
for their territory) became part of the United States in 1900.171 Congress passed
the Ratification Act in 1929 accepting the cessations of American Samoa’s
tribal leaders and formalizing its territorial status.172
In 1949, the U.S. Department of Interior introduced legislation in Congress
to incorporate American Samoa—but this was defeated through the influence
of Samoan chieftains who wished to remain unincorporated, fearing a loss of
their native customs and culture, a position that generally holds true today.173
Consequently, American Samoa remains unincorporated and the Samoan
people are considered U.S. nationals, but not citizens.174 The Tenth Circuit in
2021 declined to recognized birthright citizenship of American Samoans, which
was also opposed by the Territorial government, deferring instead to Congress:

167. Id. at 1262–63.
168. Id. at 1262.
169. Fallon, supra note 152, at 24.
170. Lin, supra note 12, at 1259–60.
171. JoAnna Poblete-Cross, Bridging Indigenous and Immigrant Struggles: A Case Study of
American Samoa, 62 AM. Q. 501, 502–03 (Sep. 2010).
172. Islands of Eastern Samoa Act of 1929, 45 Stat. 1253, 46 Stat. 4; 48 U.S.C. § 1661 (2012)
(“The cessions by certain chiefs of the islands of Tutuila and Manua and certain other islands of the
Samoan group lying between the thirteenth and fifteenth degrees of latitude south of the Equator and
between the one hundred and sixty-seventh and one hundred and seventy-first degrees of longitude
west of Greenwich, herein referred to as the islands of eastern Samoa, are accepted, ratified, and
confirmed, as of April 10, 1900, and July 16, 1904, respectively.”).
173. Riley Edward Kane, Straining Territorial Incorporation: Unintended Consequences Form
Judicially Extending Constitutional Citizenship, 80 OHIO ST. L.J., 1229, 1230–31 n.7–8 (2019). For a
detailed exposition of the American Samoan government’s arguments to retain their status quo as an
unincorporated U.S. Territory whose residents do not have U.S. citizenship, see Daniel Aga, Caribbean
Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Third Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism,
Written Statement of the American Samoa Government, at 2, U.N. Doc. CRS/2017/CRP.5/Rev.1 (May
18, 2017), https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/sites/www.un.org.dppa.decolonization/files/2017
_5_nsgt_american_samoa.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7K2-BLA9] (noting in addition to protecting
Samoan culture, direct local control of immigration maintains a 90% ethnically Samoan population
and 90% of lands owned “as communal family lands protected by local laws.”).
174. Fitisemanu v. United States, 1 F.4th 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2021), reh’g denied en banc, 20
F.4th 1325 (10th Cir. 2021).
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Figure 9: American Samoa175
It is evident that the wishes of the territory’s democratically
elected representatives, who remind us that their people have
not formed a consensus in favor of American citizenship and
urge us not to impose citizenship on an unwilling people from
a courthouse thousands of miles away, have not been taken into
adequate consideration. Such consideration properly falls
under the purview of Congress, a point on which we fully agree
with the concurrence. These circumstances advise against the
extension of birthright citizenship to American Samoa.176
Nevertheless, the Territory has been self-governing with a popularly elected
governor and bicameral legislature since promulgation of their constitution in
1967.177 Figure 9 depicts American Samoa’s position within the hierarchical
federal system, which Fallon constructs following the dichotomy of the Insular
Cases, which “are still the law of the land despite their imperialistic and racial
underpinnings.”178

175.
176.
177.
178.

GOWOROWSKA & WILSON, supra note 151, at 5.
Id.
Lin, supra note 12, at 1259.
Gelpí, supra note 85, at 2.
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Figure 10: Constitutional Application & Citizenship in the Territories179
Interestingly, on the point of incorporated versus unincorporated status, the
case of Palmyra underscores the lack of a comprehensive and cohesive federal
approach to U.S. Territories. One of the eleven uninhabited territories, Palmyra
Atoll, which lies a thousand miles south of Hawaii, is classified as
“unorganized” like American Samoa, but it is actually the only territory of the
sixteen that is “incorporated.” Thus, “[f]rom a legal standpoint, this fivesquare-mile atoll with no permanent population has more constitutional rights
than any inhabited territory.”180
179. Fallon, supra note 152, at 24.
180. MACK, supra note 6, at xxviii. Palmyra’s relatively superior constitutional status appears
to have occurred by happenstance. The Atoll was brought into the Kingdom of Hawaii by King
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Since quiescent sovereignty, like full sovereignty, rests with the people, it
is useful to consider what it is the people actually desire. Plebiscites are
typically used, although sometimes imperfectly, to ascertain the desires of the
people—a practice that dates back at least to 1599 when a plebiscite that was
held in the Philippines in response to King Philip’s decree “that the consent of
the natives to Castilian sovereignty should be secured.”181
In the cases of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, both
commonwealths have expressed their wishes to remain with the United States.
In no less than six plebiscites between 1967 and 2020, Puerto Ricans expressed
clear preferences for either statehood or status quo.182 When a plebiscite was
held in 2017 for Puerto Rico to (1) become a U.S. State, (2) become
independent and possibly enter a free association with the United States, or (3)
maintain the status quo as a U.S. Territory, 97% chose statehood—even though
turnout was less than a quarter of the electorate due to a political boycott.183
The Northern Mariana Islands, as noted above, expressed similar sentiment
to remain with the United States as the Trust Territory of the Pacific was
breaking up. Likewise, Guamanians voted in a 1976 referendum for closer
political ties with the United States and, in two 1982 plebiscites, to pursue
commonwealth status with the United States like Puerto Rico and the Northern

Kamehameha IV in 1862 and remained part of Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States in
1898. By Act of Congress, Hawaii then became an “incorporated territory” in 1900. When Hawaii
was admitted to the United States as a State in 1959, Palmyra Atoll was severed from its admission
and remained an incorporated U.S. Territory, administered by the Secretary of the Interior.
Consequently, the incorporated status of Palmyra is merely a forgotten legacy of another territory’s
transition to statehood. See Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union,
Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 6, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
181. Owen J. Lynch, Jr., The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62
PHIL. L.J. 279, 290–91 (1987). Although the chieftains that appeared for the plebiscite eventually
supported Spanish rule, as is often the case in modern referenda, the question on the ballot was
intentionally misleading:
They based their voluntary submission on the contractual promise that the king
and his subjects render each other certain services. In these documents the
conquest was interpreted as a “liberation.” In overthrowing the pagan cults the
Spaniards were said to have liberated the Filipinos from the enslavement of the
devil as well as freed them from the oppressive and tyrannical government of
their rulers. The positive benefits that the king promised to render were religious
instructions, the administration of justice, and protection against their enemies.
Id.
182. Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, No Voice, No Exit, But Loyalty? Puerto Rico
and Constitutional Obligation, 26 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 147 (2021).
183. CARTER, WEINER & HOLLIS, supra note 47, at 491.
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Marianas.184 The groundwork for a new vote sometime after 2000 to clarify
Guam’s political status was scuttled after a successful legal challenge prevailed
in the Ninth Circuit185 against a Guamanian law that restricted voting to native
Guamanians.186 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.187
80% of U.S. Virgin Islanders voted in 1993 to remain a U.S. Territory,
although the vote was invalidated because it did not meet the threshold of
participation by at least 50% of registered voters.188 Like the other Territories,
American Samoa supports its alignment with the United States. Not only does
no significant population within American Samoa desire to change its
relationship with the United States, Samoans believe preservation of their
customs and communal land tenure is tied to their original cessation by tribal
leaders to the United States and, as recently as 2017, expressed that sentiment
in no uncertain terms to the United Nations.189 Although no plebiscite on
political status has been held in American Samoa, a 2007 U.N. study on the
political status of dependencies “did not recommend any change in the region’s
relationship with the United States” and “found that American Samoans wanted
to ‘remain part of the American family of states and territories,’ they also
wanted to make sure that ‘a chosen status will not adversely affect customs and
culture, and the perpetuation of the Samoan language.’”190
Consequently, while the methods used to ascertain the people’s wishes have
been halting and certainly imperfect, and the precise parameters of the desired
connection on the part of the Territories to the United States remain somewhat
unfocused, the collective desire for a connection remains strong. The quiescent
sovereignty paradigm appears to be acceptable to most, if not all, of American
islanders in the Territories—even though full constitutional rights are not
extended to them.191 To the extent acquiescence is essential to the perpetuation
184. Lisalinda Natividad, Pacific Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Third Decade
for the Eradication of Colonialism, Statement of the Non-Self Governing Territory of Guam, at 2, UN
Doc. PRS/2012/CRP.9 (June 1, 2012), https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/sites/www.un.org.dp
pa.decolonization/files/2012_5_nsgt_guam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY79-76ZH].
185. Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019); see generally Susan K. Serrano, A Reparative
Justice Approach to Assessing Ancestral Classifications Aimed at Colonization’s Harms, 27 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 501 (2018).
186. 3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (2000), amended by Guam Pub. L. 33-148 (2016).
187. Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2739 (2020).
188. Bill Kossler, Election 2020: Referendum is a Possible Road to USVI Constitution, ST.
THOMAS SOURCE (Oct. 28, 2020), https://stthomassource.com/content/2020/10/28/election-2020referendum-is-a-possible-road-to-usvi-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/4WZJ-K4UK].
189. Aga, supra note 173, at 7 n.32.
190. Poblete-Cross, supra note 171, at 505.
191. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HRD-91-18, U.S. INSULAR AREAS:
APPLICABILITY OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1991).
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of the Territories’ quiescent sovereignty, all of the inhabited U.S. Territories
have expressed as much.192
The question then becomes, how are the voices of this quiescent
sovereignty expressed? Voices are important in sovereignty’s constant ongoing
negotiation over who has an impact on decision-making and what weight such
impacts should carry. Section IV argues for enhancing the collective voice of
the Territories in the halls of the U.S. Congress as both an acknowledgment of
their century-old loyalty and a recognition that further dignifies their quiescent
sovereignty.
IV. FEDERAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
The 3.5 million people living in U.S. Territories account for just over 1.05%
of the total U.S. population. Given this, and the fact of their physical separation
from the rest of the country, some halfway around the world, it is perhaps
unsurprising that not only does the federal government forget about the
Territories, but the American people do as well.193 For example, a 2017 poll
taken after Hurricane Maria hit Puerto Rico revealed that nearly half of
Americans don’t know that Puerto Ricans are American citizens:194
That attitude is ingrained. The territories almost never appear
on maps of the country, and census statistics usually exclude
them. (If it had been included, Manila would have been one of
the top ten largest cities in the country in the 1940s.) You can
see that neglect today in how little aid Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands got [last year] after hurricanes Maria and Irma.
Or by the lack of national attention to Typhoon Yutu, which
laid waste to the Northern Marianas [this fall].195
Yet such disregard is not returned. As noted above, the Territories have
repeatedly expressed their desire to remain connected to the United States.

192. With the exception of Cuba, technically an American protectorate from 1898 to 1902 but
never a U.S. Territory, see GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–37
(1910), all of America’s former territories have likewise maintained close ties to the U.S.—from full
defense and security measures under now independent states with Compacts of Free Association to the
U.S., to the Philippines, which still hosts twenty U.S. military facilities and has a bilateral mutual
defense agreement with the U.S. See Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-Philippines, 3 U.S.T. 3947–52,
Aug. 30, 1951.
193. Lin, supra note 12, at 1276–80; MACK, supra note 6, at xiv.
194. Kyle Droop & Brendan Nyhan, Nearly Half of Americans Don’t Know that Puerto Ricans
are
American
Citizens,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
26,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/upshot/nearly-half-of-americans-dont-know-people-in-puertoricoans-are-fellow-citizens.html [https://perma.cc/VX2L-B4PK].
195. Diamond, supra note 11.
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Indeed, not only is a high degree of patriotism noted within the Territories, but
high degrees of military service as well,196 easily outpacing enlistment rates in
the states.197 However, Congress, perhaps mirroring the attitude of most the
population, has remained largely ambivalent with respect to according
representation to Territorial Americans.
Nevertheless, each of the inhabited U.S. Territories sends a popularly
elected representative to Congress. These individuals are accorded a seat in the
House of Representatives, which is designed to represent the people, but no seat
in the Senate, which is designed to represent the states. Like the people they
represent, who cannot vote for president, Territorial delegates cannot vote on
the House floor; however, they are able to serve on House committees and do
vote in those committees.198 Table 1 records the committee assignments of
Territorial delegates for the 117th Congress:

196. Jacqueline Love, Doubt Puerto Ricans’ American Citizenship? Just Look at War Records,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Nov. 8, 2018, 1:45 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-oppuerto-ricans-fought-for-american-freedom-20181108-story.html [https://perma.cc/GD5V-BCVV];
Grace Garces Bordallo & Audrey McAvoy, Guam’s Residents Feel U.S. Patriotism but Growing
Concern, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 10, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/north-america-us-news-ap-topnews-north-korea-international-news-1805f53f99494ff69e7b210ecbba90a0 [https://perma.cc/RLH99SYS];
American
Samoa
at
a
Glance,
U.S.
ARMY
(2014),
https://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/At%20A%20Glance%20Prints/Samoa_ataglance.p
df [https://perma.cc/YF8U-ZZHR].
197. Braedyn Kromer, Thousands of U.S. Veterans Call the Island Areas Home, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
May
2,
2016,
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/randomsamplings/2016/05/thousands-of-u-s-veterans-call-the-island-areas-home.html
[https://perma.cc/T445-QDZ4]. Guam, for instance, has long been host to the U.S. Navy and will
receive 5,000 more marines who are relocating from Okinawa, Japan under the military’s Indo-Pacific
troop realignment plans. Mar-Vic Cagurangan, The U.S. Election that Doesn’t Count: Guam Goes to
the
Polls
but
Votes
Won’t
Matter,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
30,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/31/the-us-election-that-doesnt-count-guam-goes-tothe-polls-but-votes-wont-matter [https://perma.cc/WZ8J-D4P2]. Instead of considering this a colonial
occupation, Guamanians are supportive. Bordallo & McAvoy, supra note 196. “Guamanians enlist in
the US military at a higher rate than any US state. One in every 20 of Guam’s 165,000 residents is a
military veteran, according to the US census.” Cagurangan, supra note 197. American Samoa also
has one of the highest enlistment rates in the country. Kirsten Scharnberg, Where the U.S. Military is
the Family Business, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2007), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-200703-11-0703110486-story.html [https://perma.cc/G4DK-UVKG]; American Samoa at a Glance, supra
note 196.
198. H.R. Rule III, cl. 3 117th Cong. (2022).
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TERRITORIAL
DELEGATE

Stacy Plaskett
(D-V.Is.)

Michael San Nicolas
(D-Guam)

Jennifer González-Colón
(R-Puerto Rico)

Gregorio Kilili Camacho
Sablan
(I-N. Mariana Is.)

Aumua Amata Coleman
Radewagen
(R-Am. Samoa)

COMMITTEES
Ways & Means
Budget
Agriculture

Financial Services
Natural Resources

Natural Resources
Transportation

Natural Resources
Educ. & Labor
Veterans Affairs

Natural Resources
Small Business
Veterans Affairs
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SUBCOMMITTEES
Ways & Means:
- Oversight
- Select Revenue Measures
Agriculture:
- Commodities Ex., Energy, Credit
- Livestock, Foreign Agriculture
- Biotech., Horticulture, Research
Financial Services:
- Investor Prot., Entrepreneurship,
Capital Markets
- Nat’l Sec., Int’l Dev., Mon. Pol’y
Natural Resources:
- Indigenous Peoples
- Oversight & Investigation
Natural Resources:
- Water, Oceans, Wildlife
Transportation:
- Highways & Transit
- Econ. Dev., Pub. Bldg., Emergency
Management
- Water Resources & Env’t.
Natural Resources:
- Nat’l Parks, Forests, Pub. Lands
Education & Labor:
- Early Childhood, Elem., Secondary
Veteran’s Affairs:
- Disability & Memorial Aff.
- Health
Natural Resources:
- Water, Oceans, Wildlife
- Indigenous Peoples
Small Business:
- Rural Dev., Agriculture, Trade,
Entrepreneurship
- Econ. Growth, Tax, Capital Access
Veterans Affairs:
- Oversight & Investigations
- Health

Table 1: Territorial Representation in the House199
199. Congressional
Committees,
CONGRESSWOMAN
STACEY
E.
PLASKETT,
https://plaskett.house.gov/biography/congressional-committees.htm [https://perma.cc/6FT7-MHRQ];
Committees and Caucuses, THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL F.Q. SAN NICOLAS,
https://sannicolas.house.gov/about/committees-and-caucuses
[https://perma.cc/S76B-SYVP];
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The House’s Natural Resources Committee is the designated home for
Territorial concerns, or, as Congress refers to them, “Insular Affairs.” These
are quietly tucked away in what amounts to an invisible subcommittee, known
in the 117th Congress as the “Full Committee on Insular Affairs,” meaning it is
not an identifiable subcommittee—the portfolio is handled at the full committee
level, but the distinctly identifiable subcommittee has been lost. While the
other Territorial delegates serve on this full committee, Ms. Plaskett from the
U.S. Virgin Islands does not.
Historically, Insular Affairs has been a political football tossed among
multiple manifestations of the House committee system. The House actually
once had a standing committee on Insular Affairs, established in 1899 but
abolished in 1946—its purview transferred to the Committee on Public
Lands.200 In 1951, the Insular Affairs nomenclature was resurrected when the
Committee on Public Lands became the Committee on Interior and Insular

Committees and Caucuses, U.S. CONGRESSWOMAN JENNIFER GONZÁLEZ-COLÓN, https://gonzalezcolon.house.gov/about/committees-and-caucuses
[https://perma.cc/HK2A-NWTP];
Committee
Assignments,
U.S.
CONGRESSMAN
GREGORIO
KILILI
CAMACHO
SABLAN,
https://sablan.house.gov/about-me/committee-assignments
[https://perma.cc/6TXS-EW9E];
Committees and Caucuses, CONGRESSWOMAN AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN,
https://radewagen.house.gov/about/committees-and-caucuses [https://perma.cc/PC6B-K92M].
200. NAT’L ARCHIVES, GUIDE TO HOUSE RECORDS: CH. 13, RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 56TH–79TH CONGRESSES (1899–1946):
On December 8, 1899, the House established the Committee on Insular Affairs
to consider “all matters (excepting those affecting the revenue and
appropriations) pertaining to the islands which came to the United States through
the treaty of 1899 with Spain, and to Cuba.” Just 6 days earlier, on December 6,
1899, the United States had acquired exclusive rights to certain islands in Samoa
through an agreement with England and Germany. Subsequently, matters
relating to American Samoa also came within the committee’s jurisdiction. In
1902 the Republic of Cuba was established, and jurisdiction over matters
concerning Cuba was transferred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1906.
Eventually, the jurisdiction of the Committee on Insular Affairs was expanded to
cover the Virgin Islands of the United States which were purchased from
Denmark by the treaty in 1916. In 1946 the committee was abolished and its
responsibilities transferred to the Committee on Public Lands.
The Committee on Insular Affairs reported legislation concerning civil
governments for each of the insular possessions. The committee also reported
legislation concerning the clarification of citizenship status of inhabitants of the
islands, ratification and confirmation of actions of the Philippine and Puerto
Rican legislatures, matters relating to public works, harbor improvements,
wharves, roads, railways, telephone and telegraph cables, electricity, trade and
tariff laws, prohibition, education, taxes, bond issues, and relief from hurricanes
and the depression. The committee also issued reports on the social, economic,
and political conditions in the insular possessions.
Id. at 13.95–13.96.
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Affairs.201 That lasted until 1993, when Insular Affairs was pushed back down
into a subcommittee of the newly designated Committee on Natural
Resources.202
In the modern era, up through the 113th Congress, Insular Affairs came
under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and
Insular Affairs; however, with the 114th Congress in 2015, the new Natural
Resources Committee Chair shuffled the subcommittees, creating a new
subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs.203 However, from
the 115th to the 116th Congress, Insular Affairs was dropped from having a
title and existed as part of the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Indigenous
Peoples of the United States.204 Now, in the 117th Congress, Insular Affairs
continues to remain unidentified (neither a committee nor subcommittee with
its own staff or budget), but has instead been taken up as a subject of the Natural
Resources Committee; thus, when the full committee is dealing with Insular
Affairs, it functionally becomes the “Full Committee on Insular Affairs.”205
This move, by current Natural Resources Committee Chair Rep. Raul
Grijalva (D-Ariz.), was ostensibly meant to be an elevation of Insular Affairs
as an issue to the full committee level. When Insular Affairs are taken up by
the full committee, Rep. Grijalva chairs the session, as he would any meeting
of the Committee, but the Vice Chair for Insular Affairs becomes Gregorio
Sablan (I-N. Mariana Is.), and the Ranking Member for Insular Affairs becomes
Jennifer González-Colón (R-P.R.)—both Rep. Sablan and Rep. GonzálezColón then fade back into regular committee membership when non-insular
affairs are being considered.
201. NAT’L ARCHIVES, GUIDE TO HOUSE RECORDS: CH. 13, RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 82–90TH CONGRESSES (1951–1968) at 13.107.
202. Id.
203. New Subcommittees Announced for the House Natural Resources Committee, AM.
GEOSCIENCES INST. (Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.americangeosciences.org/policy/news-briefs/newsubcommittees-announced-for-the-House-Natural-Resources-Committee [https://perma.cc/ZM6GS927].
204. House Natural Resources Committee Set to Hold First Meeting, INDIANZ (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.indianz.com/News/2015/016258.asp [https://perma.cc/F6V2-WSGS].
205. See COMM. ON NAT. RES., 117TH CONG., RULES FOR THE COMM. ON NAT. RES. 15,
https://www.congress.gov/117/cprt/HPRT43461/CPRT-117HPRT43461.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/VMD5-P24F] [hereinafter COMMITTEE RULES]. “Insular affairs” underwent a
similar trajectory in the Senate: from being a standing committee as the Committee on Territories and
Insular Possessions (1921–29) and the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs (1929–46) to being
subsumed in 1947 as a subject of the Senate’s Committee on Energy & Natural Resources, only to
return as the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs from 1948–68. See NAT’L ARCHIVES, GUIDE
TO SENATE RECORDS: CH. 12, RECORDS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
AND PREDECESSOR COMMITTEES, 1816–1968, at 12.64–12.65. Insular affairs is now covered in the
Senate as one of the subjects of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
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While some might agree that this is a promotion of sorts, from a
subcommittee handling the subject to a standing committee handling the subject
at the committee level, Insular Affairs actually has been further marginalized.
Subsumed as an issue of the Committee, Insular Affairs no longer exists in a
tangible, identifiable way. Indeed, when one searches for it on the House
website, unlike other committees and subcommittees whose pages appear with
identification of which members are serving as well as dedicated staff
information and statements of jurisdiction, the Full Committee on Insular
Affairs lists nobody to contact and appears to refer all viewers to the Office of
Insular Affairs in the Department of Interior.206
In fact, this is not the case. The Full Committee on Insular Affairs
apparently now calls itself, confusingly, the Office of Insular Affairs as well.
While there is no description of what the Congressional version of OIA does
on the Full Committee website, a short jurisdictional statement can be found on
the page that lists, again confusingly, the “subcommittees” of the Natural
Resources Committee:
The Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) coordinates federal
legislation for the U.S. territories of American Samoa, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI),
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI).
Residents of the territories are U.S. citizens or nationals. OIA
also oversees legislation to provide federal assistance under
Compacts of Free Association to the Federated States of
Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
Republic of Palau, and helps maintain strategic relationships
with all U.S.-affiliated insular areas.207
Coverage adds yet another layer to the discord. The Congressional OIA
includes coverage of issues for Puerto Rico, while the Executive OIA does
not—issues concerning Puerto Rico are handled elsewhere within the
administration. The Committee staff acknowledge the confusion and explain
that while the Congressional OIA focuses on policy and legislation, the
Executive OIA focuses on execution and implementation. Staff members with
experience in Insular Affairs, who previously worked for the subcommittee,
now work for the full Natural Resources Committee.

206. See NATURAL RESOURCES COMM., FULL COMM. ON INSULAR AFFAIRS,
https://naturalresources.house.gov/subcommittees/full-committee-insularaffairs#:~:text=The%20Office%20of%20Insular%20Affairs,are%20U.S.%20citizens%20or%20natio
nals [https://perma.cc/CPJ3-2U8M].
207. See
HOUSE
NATURAL
RESOURCES
COMM.,
SUBCOMMITTEES,
https://naturalresources.house.gov/subcommittees [https://perma.cc/5E4A-VPHF].
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To understand the current near-invisible and confused state of Insular
Affairs in the House, one must go back to the re-shuffle of subcommittees in
2015. Back then, the new Committee Chair, Rep. Rob Bishop (R-Utah), added
Insular Affairs to the Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs to
create the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs.208 This
was seen in Indian country as an intentional dilution of focus on Native
Americans.209 Indeed, the ranking Democrat, Rep. Grijalva, said, “We’re
concerned that the proposed reorganization of the subcommittees may
marginalize Native American tribal issues,” and moved to strike the
reorganization to keep Indian affairs separated from Insular Affairs, but was
defeated.210
Consequently, it is not surprising that as chair, Rep. Grijalva, though not
intending to purposely devalue Insular Affairs, once again stripped Insular
Affairs away from Indian affairs in order to put a spotlight back on what is,
after all, one of his key constituency groups in Arizona. Rep. Grijalva’s 3rd
Congressional District in Arizona is “home to four sovereign nations: the
Cocopah, Pascua Yaqui, Quechan, and Tohono O’odham,” as well as many
“urban Native American residents.”211 The reconstituted Subcommittee for
Indigenous Peoples of the United States now has a robust jurisdiction statement
on its dedicated website:
As the sole Subcommittee with exclusive jurisdiction over
American Indian, Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian issues
in the House of Representatives, the Subcommittee oversees
matters ranging from natural resources and land management,
ownership, and leasing to Indian health care, tribal criminal
justice, development of reservation economies, enhancement
of social welfare and improvement of energy efficiency and
renewable energy development initiatives on tribal lands.
The goal of the Subcommittee is to protect tribal
sovereignty and tribes’ authority over their lands and natural
resources while empowering tribal communities with
208. Rob Capriccioso, Rep. Rob Bishop Angers House Colleagues over His Handling of Indian
Affairs, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018), https://indiancountrytoday.com/archive/rep-robbishop-angers-house-colleagues-handling-indian-affairs [https://perma.cc/8ADE-E36L].
209. House Committee Won’t Restore Indian and Alaska Native Panel, INDIANZ (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.indianz.com/News/2015/01/28/house-committee-wont-restore-i.asp
[https://perma.cc/6RJ7-C6E8]. In fact, Rep. Bishop’s hostility toward Indian affairs and antipathy
toward Native American sovereignty was later revealed in hearings that resulted in significant
pushback from members of both parties. Capriccioso, supra note 208.
210. INDIANZ, supra note 209.
211. About the District, CONGRESSMAN RAÚL M. GRIJALVA, https://standwithraul.com/district/
[https://perma.cc/E4L4-G9Y4].
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enhanced self-governance authorities.212
Meanwhile, Insular Affairs remains hidden within the full committee, not
chaired by a Territorial delegate, and relegated to somewhere between nonexistence and utter confusion on the Internet. Moreover, only subcommittees
receive a dedicated budget.213 The status of Insular Affairs in Congress—where
the voice of Americans living in the Territories can be heard and where that
voice “lives”—needs to be improved. Recognition by the European Union
(EU) of the importance of subnational voices to the enrichment of Europeanwide legislation offers a guide on why and how to institutionally elevate and
channel those voices from one of our closest democratic allies.
A. EU Committee of the Regions
The EU was formed by multilateral treaty among Member States at the
beginning of the Cold War to integrate key sectors of Western European
economies.214 Closer integration and member state expansion occurred in the
ensuing decades, along with necessary surrenders of more state sovereignty
along the way.215 All of this transpired at the nation-state level, with occasional
referenda among populations, but without meaningful organized input by
ethnically or linguistically distinct minority regions within Member States such
as, Scotland, Catalonia, Bavaria, Corsica, or the Basque Country.
Although many of these distinct European regions, like American
Territories, are self-governing,216 they have little say in the decisions of the
Member States within which they lie with respect to foreign affairs in general
or European integration in particular. A gradual recognition of this oversight
and the value of regional input on EU policy led to a structural solution. “The
creation of the Committee of the Regions . . . was an expression of this

212. HOUSE COM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, SUBCOM. FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THE U.S.,
https://naturalresources.house.gov/subcommittees/subcommittee-for-indigenous-peoples-of-theunited-states [https://perma.cc/9K4E-X26T] (internal citation omitted).
213. See COMM. ON NAT. RES., supra note 205, at 19.
214. Craig Parsons, Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union, 56 INT’L
ORG. 47 (2002).
215. Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union, 49 INT’L ORG.
171, 173 (1995). Indeed, recapture of sovereignty was a key determinant in the United Kingdom’s
decision to exit the EU in 2016. Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo & Kai Opperman, Role Theory,
Foreign Policy, and the Social Construction of Sovereignty: Brexit Stage Right, 1 GLOB. STUD. Q. 1,
3 (2021) (“During and after the referendum, domestic debate focused on issues connected to
sovereignty and its relative value for Britain.”).
216. Lindsay Murphy, Comment, EU Membership and an Independent Basque State, 19 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 321–22 (2007).
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willingness to involve local and regional authorities and to enable them to
represent their interests in the EU’s institutional architecture.”217
Creation of the Committee of the Regions was an evolutionary process.
Although the 1957 Treaty of Rome, one of the E.U.’s founding treaties,
provided for regional policy, it was only in 1975, with the creation of the
European Regional Development Fund, that such input began at the federal
level.218 Even then, there was disagreement between the Commission and the
Parliament as to the role of the regions—the Commission viewing them more
as economic units purposed for delivery of EU funds rather than as political
actors.219
Eventually, in 1991, as part of the zeitgeist sparked by the fall of the Berlin
Wall, political will to integrate the Member States of the EU more quickly and
more deeply was secured, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty laid the legal
foundations for the Committee’s birth in 1994 as part of that deeper
integration.220 Much of the forward motion was generated by the German
Länder which “envisaged the creation of ‘a regional interests body to enable
the particular needs and interests of the regions to be taken into account in the
Community’s legislative process.’”221 Loss of sovereignty was a driving
concern for the Länder, who felt “[t]hey were becoming ‘trapped nations’
between the federal state and the EEC, at risk of a gradual erosion of their
legislative power.”222
As to what the new Committee of the Regions should be empowered to do,
two seemingly irreconcilable visions emerged: the EU Commission wished it
to be merely a consultative body of the Commission, but Germany wished it to
be truly co-decisional in the EU legislative process.223 The compromise that
was reached empowered the Committee closer to the German position, but it
was not reached via the laborious draftsmanship of multiple groups and states
seeking to find a solution; rather, realpolitik was the final arbiter:
An anecdote going the rounds at the Committee of the Regions
sheds light on the Committee’s sudden independence in terms
of powers, status and system of consultation. Apparently, the
outcome was the result of a last-minute deal between the
French president and the German chancellor: “It was almost
over and Mitterrand wanted to leave. His plane had the engines
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

BIRTE WASSENBERG, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 11 (2020).
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 21–24.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 38–39.
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running at the airport in Maastricht. And Mitterrand
apparently said to Kohl: ‘Do you really want this Committee
of the Regions?’ And Kohl replied: ‘Yes, I do, I need it for the
Länder.’ To which Mitterrand said: ‘Then you shall have
it.’”224
While it began with quite limited engagement, the Committee achieved
both independence and influence by building up its inter-institutional
relationships with other bodies within the EU.225 The reality of EU policy
implementation explains the rationale underlying this natural basis for
relationship-building: “Given that 70% of EU legislation needs to be
implemented at the regional level, it was meant to give regional governments a
greater voice in EU policy-making.”226
As a vehicle for the voices of subnational polities to be heard,227 the
Committee has in fact evolved into a rather effective component of the EU
legislative system.228 Formally, the Committee exists alongside the European
Economic and Social Council in a consultative status for EU legislation that
affects a certain range of areas. Yet, informally, the Committee has come to be
regarded by the Commission as a body that “can provide expertise on the reality
of implementation of EU policy on the ground, and local/regional situations,”
and by the Parliament as a body that “could provide additional democratic
legitimacy for European integration by bringing local concerns to the EU level
and explaining EU decisions back in their regions.”229
Structurally, beyond its consultative and persuasive roles, the Committee
can take on a watchdog role by challenging proposed EU legislation as violative
of the principle of subsidiarity in the European Court of Justice.230 For example,
224. Id. at 43.
225. Id. at 74; SIMONA PIATTONI & JUSTUS SCHÖNLAU, SHAPING EU POLICY FROM BELOW:
EU DEMOCRACY AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 89 (2015) (“[T]he multiple connections and
cooperative arrangements that the [Committee of the Regions] has been developing with other bodies
are part of its claim to help to link EU decision-making more directly to a particular category of
stakeholders, that is, local and regional authorities, in order to increase the democratic legitimacy of
EU policy-making.”).
226. Dave Keating, Can an ‘EU of the Regions’ Offer an Alternative to Catalan Secession?,
EURACTIV (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/mon-can-an-eu-of-theregions-offer-an-alternative-to-catalan-secession/ [https://perma.cc/65AT-DQUZ].
227. PIATTONI & SCHÖNLAU, supra note 225, at 57.
228. While it began with 189 representatives in 1994, through EU expansion, representation on
the Committee of the Regions has risen to 350. Justus Schönlau, Beyond Mere ‘Consultation’:
Expanding the European Committee of the Regions’ Role, 13 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 1166, 1172
(2017).
229. Schönlau, supra note 228, at 1169.
230. Salvatore Fabio Nicolosi & Lisette Mustert, The European Committee of the Regions as a
Watchdog of the Principle of Subsidiarity, 27 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 284, 285–86 (2020).
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in 2018 a measure initiated by the Commission concerning EU regional funds
was threatened with such a court challenge by the Committee of the Regions,
and the Commission backed down, took the Committee argument into account,
and amended the proposal accordingly.231
European regions also realize a degree of sovereign dignity through
representation on the Committee of the Regions—opening regional offices in
Brussels, working with other representatives, interacting directly with the EU
bureaucracy, and reporting back to their constituents on EU policy
developments without going through national filters that may not report what
is important to those minority regions. Indeed, the Committee of the Regions
was one of the key brokers of conciliation between the national government of
Spain and the regional government of Catalonia in the wake of the region’s
referendum vote favoring independence.232
Perhaps one measure of the Committee’s effectiveness lies in the
continuing dialogue that United Kingdom regions and territories seek to
maintain with it. Within the U.K., the people of England were the key deciders
in the referendum to leave the EU,233 as opposed to people in the British regions
and territories.234 Consequently, the non-English region of Scotland and the
British territory of Gibraltar (which shares a border with the EU via Spain),
continue consulting with their contacts on the EU’s Committee of the
Regions.235
In the end, Europe’s Committee of the Regions offers an example of how a
group of democracies recognized the need for subnational representation at the
federal level, and then achieved that in such a way that left open the possibility
of expanding influence and participation in policy development and legislative
impact. A structural accommodation to enhance the role of U.S. Territories in
the House could yield similarly positive results. In fact, the conclusions of a
231. Id. at 286.
232. Nikolaj Nielsen, Basque Threat of ‘Second Front’ for Independence, EU OBSERVER (June
18, 2018), https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/142109 [https://perma.cc/VNN2-XECG].
233. EU Referendum: The Result in Maps and Charts, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36616028 [https://perma.cc/87K8-3BN9].
234. Gavin Lee, Brexit: End to Gibraltar Land Border Prompts Joy and Trepidation, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 16, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55674148 [https://perma.cc/KNY3-7GXJ]
(“People in Gibraltar voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU in the Brexit referendum.”); Stephen
Castle, Of Brexit and Boris: What’s Driving the Call for Scottish Independence, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/world/europe/brexit-scotland-independence.html
[https://perma.cc/2S2G-SDQA] (“While England voted to leave the European Union, 62 percent of
Scottish voters wanted to stay.”).
235. Gibraltar Briefs EU Committee of the Regions on Border Concerns, GIB. CHRON. (Nov.
16, 2020), https://www.chronicle.gi/gibraltar-briefs-eu-committee-of-the-regions-on-border-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/C9C7-J29K].
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2015 study on the contributions of the Committee of the Regions to democratic
decision-making at the federal level in the EU mirror the institutional checks
against federal domination that a permanent select committee on Territorial
affairs could achieve at the federal level in the United States:
[T]he CoR [Committee of the Regions] contributes to
democracy as non-domination by constantly reminding
delegated national governmental representatives in the Council
and directly elected members of the European Parliament of
the potential domination inherent in EU legislation . . . .
‘[D]omination is not simply tyranny nor the ability to interfere
arbitrarily. It is . . . rule by another, one who is able to
prescribe the terms of cooperation . . . .’ ‘[T]o have robust
non-domination is to have a particular kind of normative status,
a status allowing one to create and regulate obligations with
others. This is the status of non-domination rather than selflegislation.’ It is not to be ruled by others, but to rule with
others.
. . . CoR activity can be certainly construed as contributing
both to deliberation (the production of rules and obligations)
and to surveillance (the control that these are not simply
imposed). . . . [V]ery often the CoR contributes opinions on
EU legislation which defend the right of the subnational demoi
of the Union to non-domination, that is, their right not to be
‘imposed the terms of cooperation’ particularly when such
cooperation entails asymmetric costs and limitations on them.
In alerting the other EU institutions of the danger of imposing
the terms of cooperation . . . , the CoR gives its contribution to
EU democracy interpreted as ‘the capacity to deliberate and to
change the terms of democratic cooperation, and thus have
normative power over the distribution of normative powers.’
In this sense, the contribution of the CoR must not be solely
assessed as a contribution to the formation of
legislation . . . , but as a contribution to the deliberation over
the terms of democratic governance.236
B. Permanent Select Committee on Territorial Affairs
Article I, Section 5, of the U.S. Constitution accords each house of
Congress the flexibility to conduct its own internal business.237 Both houses

236. PIATTONI & SCHÖNLAU, supra note 225, at 16–17 (internal citations omitted).
237. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5.
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utilize the committee system to accomplish their constitutional tasks.238 “The
principal organizational device for achieving necessary specialization of tasks
and division of labor in the United States Congress is the committee system.
Congressional Committees have tended to become independent and
autonomous little legislatures, occupying a formidable place in the
congressional decision-making process.”239
The introduction to this section probed the ineffectiveness of the current
arrangement of Insular Affairs being subsumed as a subject within the purview
of the House’s full Natural Resources Committee, not chaired by a Territorial
delegate, as a vehicle for delivering the subnational quiescent sovereign voices
of the Territories meaningfully into the federal legislative system. The EU,
facing a similar dilemma, found a way to achieve greater input from subnational
units that were not being effectively represented by their national delegations
through a structural solution: creation of the Committee of the Regions.
Correspondingly, the House should elevate Insular Affairs into a Permanent
Select Committee on Territorial Affairs chaired by a Territorial delegate.240
Select Committees are of limited scope and jurisdiction and usually temporary
in nature.241 However, just as the House’s Select Committee on Intelligence,
created in 1975, became the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in
1977, that temporary nature can change—as can its staffing, budget, and
jurisdictional scope.
The Senate’s elevation of Indian affairs provides a ready precedent
endorsing this structural response in an area of sovereignty concerns. In the
95th Congress (1977), the Senate created a Select Committee on Indian Affairs,
then elevated it to a permanent select committee in the 98th Congress (1984),

238. George B. Galloway, Development of the Committee System in the House of
Representatives, 65 AM. HIST. REV. 17 (1959). See H.R. Rule X–XI, 117th Cong. (2021).
239. Samuel C. Patterson, The Professional Staffs of Congressional Committees, 15 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 22 (1970) (internal citations omitted).
240. The proposed select committee could, and perhaps should, encompass more than U.S.
Territories. A Permanent Select Committee on U.S. Territories, Tribes, and the Federal District would
certainly bring sovereignty issues of federally recognized Native American tribes and the District of
Columbia meaningfully into a more structurally sound representation with Territories. Similar to the
Territories, the District of Columbia has a non-voting member of the House and at least two tribes, the
Cherokee and Choctaw, have treaties that provide for representation in Congress; the Cherokee nation
appointed a non-voting delegate-nominee in 2019, but the House has yet to approve her appointment.
Brigit Katz, Kimberly Teehee Will Be the Cherokee Nation’s First Delegate to Congress,
SMITHSONIAN (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/kimberly-teeheecherokee-nations-first-delegate-congress-180973046/ [https://perma.cc/H5XZ-D8RS]. However, to
explore that expanded version of this select committee would require a related but very different
sovereignty analysis than is offered here; thus, that discussion remains beyond the scope of this Article.
241. Galloway, supra note 238, at 17.
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then redesignated it the Committee on Indian Affairs in the 103rd Congress
(1993).242 Thus, the Senate settled on a structural solution to lift Native
American sovereignty issues into an important Congressional space.
Parallel elevation of Territorial sovereignty issues in the House is not
unreasonable. Doing so would immediately realize at least three tangible
benefits: (1) amplifying and focusing the voice of the Territories in Congress,
(2) channeling the efforts and interests of Territorial delegates into a unit that
can have meaningful power to conduct hearings, issue subpoenas, and conduct
oversight, and (3) increasing the impact Territories can have on federal
legislation.
First, a select committee chaired by a Territorial delegate, as opposed to a
“full committee” or subcommittee not chaired by a Territorial delegate,
essentially swaps a muted microphone for a much more communicative
megaphone. Providing a structure for these five, out of 535, contributors to our
democratic dialogue ensures not only that their voices are not lost in the
cacophony of Congress but also that they are actually heard. Moreover,
creating a permanent select committee would remove the vulnerability of
Territorial affairs existing at the whim of the chair.
Nor should the power that comes with chairing a committee in the House
be underestimated.243 Chairing a committee has both external and internal
dimensions. Externally, once a Territorial delegate is appointed chair of a select
committee, that delegate is then part of the leadership configuration of the
House. Suddenly with the leadership “doors open,” a Territorial delegate would
interact with the Speaker, Majority Leader, Majority Whip, and their respective
staffs on more parity than other members of the House could.
Internally, not only do chairs set the agendas for their respective committees
but they also control the budget, staffing, oversight direction, and participation
in the legislative process—depending upon the parameters of the committee’s
jurisdiction.244 Chairs also wield near plenary power in organizing/reorganizing their committee and subcommittee structure, as demonstrated by the
arbitrary re-shuffling of Insular Affairs discussed in the introduction to this
section. Moreover, recent research indicates that committee membership is far

242. Committee
Name
History,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/help/committee-name-history [https://perma.cc/74BD-37TA].
243. JUDY SCHNEIDER & MICHAEL L. KOEMPEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34679, HOUSE
COMMITTEE CHAIRS: CONSIDERATIONS, DECISIONS, AND ACTIONS AS ONE CONGRESS ENDS AND A
NEW CONGRESS BEGINS 11 (2014).
244. Galloway, supra note 238, at 22–23; see H.R. Rule, supra note 238, at XI.
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less important, certainly with respect to securing benefits for their legislative
districts, than actually chairing a committee.245
Second, a select committee chaired by a Territorial delegate can more
effectively build a record through inquiry and investigation if the committee is
so empowered:246
The enabling chamber rule or resolution that gives a committee
life is also the charter that defines the grant and limitations of
the committee’s investigative powers. The committee charter
constrains committees in two meaningful ways. First, as a
creation of its parent house, a congressional committee may
inquire only into matters within the scope of the authority that
has been delegated to it—i.e. within its jurisdiction. Second,
in conducting investigations, a committee generally must
comply with any procedural requirements contained in its
charter, its own rules, or the rules of the parent chamber.247
Third, Territorial voices in the House can better influence legislation from
a permanent select committee than from a temporary existence when Insular
Affairs is on the agenda of the full committee, or even by a subcommittee
confined to a certain subject area. In the 116th Congress, only 2.5% of over
9,000 bills introduced in the House became law.248 Untucking Territorial
legislative concerns from several layers of the House’s labyrinthine legislative
process would better position those concerns to be addressed.
For example, by way of federal benefits, Americans residing in the
Territories generally receive less than those living in the states249 and are more
adversely affected by federal tax provisions other than income tax—which most
do not pay.250 A tax measure introduced to deal with this would then be referred
245. Christopher R. Berry & Anthony Fowler, Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees
and the Distribution of Pork, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 692, 693 (July 2016); Christopher R. Berry &
Anthony Fowler, Congressional Committees, Legislative Influence, and the Hegemony of Chairs, 158
J. PUB. ECON. 1 (Feb. 2018) (“[M]uch of the power of committees is concentrated among chairs.”).
246. See H.R. Rule, supra note 238, at XI.
247. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, TODD GARVEY & BEN WILHELM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30240,
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 39 (2021) (footnotes omitted).
248. Craig Volden & Alan E. Wiseman, Committee Chairs Continue Their Lawmaking Decline,
THE HILL (Mar. 25, 2021), https://batten.virginia.edu/about/news/volden-committee-chairs-continuetheir-lawmaking-decline [https://perma.cc/NC5U-8KRC].
249. Steve Limtiaco, Feds Defend Law that Denies SSI Income Benefits to Guam Residents with
Disabilities, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.guampdn.com/news/local/feds-defendlaw-that-denies-ssi-income-benefits-to-guam-residents-with-disabilities/article_421cc6e5-045c-548eb223-7a178cadfc1f.html [https://perma.cc/65KH-QGMV] (recounting the story of a woman who
received disability benefits for a genetic disorder while a resident of Pennsylvania, which were then
terminated once she became a resident of Guam).
250. Lin, supra note 12, at 1266–68.
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to the Ways & Means Committee, not the Insular Affairs subject area of the
Natural Resources Committee. With the exception of twelve Appropriations
subcommittees, subcommittees are less likely to receive legislative referrals.251
Consequently, Territorial delegates would not be able to influence it from their
position.
Stacey Plaskett has successfully short-circuited this process. In the 117th
Congress, she obtained a coveted seat on Ways & Means, the first Territorial
delegate to ever do so.252 Once on that committee, a member is generally not
allowed to serve on any other committee unless they receive a waiver from
party leadership.253 She immediately introduced two bills, the Territorial Tax
Parity Act and the Territorial Tax Equity and Economic Growth Act, to address
the uneven tax issues experienced by Americans in the Territories.254
A permanent select committee would have much more leeway to move
legislation affecting the Territories forward than a subcommittee relegated to
defined subject area such as natural resources. The Speaker’s referral power
allows her to make multiple referrals;255 thus, Ms. Plaskett’s territorial tax
reform bills could simultaneously be referred to Ways & Means due to their
subject matter as well as to a permanent select committee on U.S. Territories
chaired by a Territorial delegate due to the area the bills affect.
Territorial Affairs in the House should be placed on par with how the Senate
considers Indian Affairs. As demonstrated in the current Congress with respect
to statehood movements for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia,
sovereignty concerns do not simply fade away. In the 117th Congress, the
House has created a new Select Committee on Economic Disparity and Fairness
in Growth.256 The House should now proceed to elevate the Committee on
Natural Resources’ Full Committee on Insular Affairs to a House Permanent
Select Committee on Territorial Affairs chaired by a Territorial delegate.
251. MARK J. OLESZEK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46251, COMMITTEE JURISDICTION AND
REFERRAL IN THE HOUSE 4 (2020).
252. A.J. Rao, Plaskett to Sit on Influential House Panel, V.I. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 24, 2020)
http://www.virginislandsdailynews.com/news/plaskett-to-sit-on-influential-housepanel/article_d1546aa0-a8b9-5435-a449-860d3042916a.html [https://perma.cc/X639-7EZT].
253. Ms. Plaskett apparently received a waiver to also serve on the Budget and Agriculture
Committees. Id.
254. Press Release, Stacey E. Plaskett, Congresswoman Stacey E. Plaskett Introduces New
Legislation Aimed at Improving Economic Conditions in the Territory (Feb. 26, 2021),
https://plaskett.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3753
[https://perma.cc/6EV223TL].
255. OLESZEK, supra note 251, at 2.
256. Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Announces Creation of Select Committee on Economic
Disparity and Fairness in Growth (Dec. 30, 2020) https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/123020
[https://perma.cc/4YR2-9U84].
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Dropping the sobriquet Insular Affairs is symbolically important, not only to
further distance the quiescent sovereignty concerns of American islanders in
the Territories from the Supreme Court’s racially charged Insular Cases, but to
stop using colonial-era jargon in the modern age and to instead recognize “U.S.
Territories” as such.
The procedure for select committee creation is fairly straightforward under
House rules.257 Moreover, there is no legal barrier to doing so. Perhaps more
importantly, the political parties are fairly equally represented among the
Territorial delegates: two Democrats, two Republicans, and an Independent.
Bipartisanship is a rare thing on Capitol Hill in the 21st Century, but this effort
could be an example. Yet committee creation is ultimately a leadership
decision, which means it currently rests with Speaker Nancy Pelosi and
Majority Leader Stenny Hoyer’s team.
That team would then have to persuade the Natural Resources Committee
to relinquish jurisdiction over Insular Affairs—a request most committee chairs
would view not welcome. In the jurisdictional turf wars between committees,
losing jurisdiction would necessarily have to come from the top. This could
theoretically happen at any time via the House Rules Committee, as evidenced
by the just-announced new select committee to investigate the January 6th
insurrection.258 However, the more likely scenario might be during the 118th
Congress re-organization.
As Majority Leader Hoyer said with respect to removing Confederate
statuary from the Capitol, “It’s never too late to do the right thing, and this
legislation would work to right a historic wrong while ensuring our Capitol
reflects the principles and ideals of what Americans stand for.”259
Institutionally enabling the non-voting representatives of Americans in the
Territories accomplishes both.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy remarked in Boumediene v. Bush, “It may well be that over
time the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated territories

257. See H.R. Rule, supra note 238, at X and XI.
258. Felicia Sonmez, Pelosi Introduced Legislation That Would Establish Select Committee to
Probe
Jan.
6
Capitol
Attack,
WASH.
POST
(June
28,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pelosi-introduces-legislation-that-would-establish-selectcommittee-to-probe-jan-6-capitol-attack/2021/06/28/1d40b2c8-d852-11eb-9bbb37c30dcf9363_story.html [https://perma.cc/KX32-6MVL].
259. Alex Rogers, House Votes to Remove Confederate Statues and Replace Roger B. Taney
Bust, CNN (June 29, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/29/politics/house-vote-confederatestatues/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y773-GY2X].
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strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance.”260 Until that time
comes, the Court’s previous observation in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,
recognizing that “Congress has broad latitude to develop innovative approaches
to territorial governance”261 should be seen as an invitation.
Creating a new House Permanent Select Committee Territorial Affairs
takes the Court up on that invitation in at least three ways: (1) amplifying the
voice of the Territories in Congress, (2) channeling the energies of Territorial
delegates into a focused power that can result in hearings and subpoenas, and
(3) increasing the impact Territories can have on federal legislation. The time
has come to place Territorial Affairs in the House on parity with Indian Affairs
in the Senate.
Perhaps President Trump’s offer to purchase the territory of Greenland
from Denmark in 2019, an offer rejected by Copenhagen just as the 1946
American offer had been, belies a certain mentality still clinging to the notion
of transaction-based management of territories.262 That mentality rests on the
notion of plenary federal authority over U.S. Territories—an approach first
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Insular Cases and one that remains
its operative paradigm,263 despite the hopeful enunciations cited above.
This is all the more reason to strengthen the voice and effect of the
Territories in Congress. Short of allowing them a floor vote, incorporating the
Territories, or granting them statehood—none of which is meaningfully on the
table—this is the most reasonable approach to increasing their participation in
governance at the federal level, thereby further operationalizing their quiescent
sovereignty. Such an internal structural adjustment to House rules is even more
appealing given the absence of a legal barrier for doing so.
The spark that Stacey Plaskett lit in our collective political conscience about
the status of American islanders in the Territories has created an opening to act.
It is precisely because they cannot vote at home that their voice in Congress
must be elevated—there is no other path short of extending the full American
franchise to the Territories. The people of the U.S. Territories have
demonstrated time and again through extensive military service and multiple
plebiscites that they want to be part of the United States—somehow. It is well
past time for America to reciprocate this commitment. Congress has an

260. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008).
261. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 77 (2016).
262. Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman, Trump’s Interest in Buying Greenland Seemed Like a
Joke.
Then
It
Got
Ugly.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
21,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-prime-minister.html
[https://perma.cc/H4NH-5AYM].
263. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. at 78.
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opportunity to do so. Bringing the quiescent sovereignty of our Territories into
fuller flower in the U.S. House of Representatives would be an important
substantive and symbolic move in that direction.

